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 1.  Introduction 
Direct democracy is a widely used means to choose public policies in non-autocratic politi-
cal economies. One typical feature of direct public votes is the “swing voter’s curse” 
(Feddersen & Pesendorfer, 1996), which may lead to uninformed agents abstaining from a 
referendum. The resulting oversampling of informed agents can be welfare-enhancing if 
voters are like-minded, and hence, the less informed “delegate” voting to the better in-
formed. It has been demonstrated that the outcome of referenda can lead to greater wel-
fare than (stated preference-based) cost–benefit analyses when individuals have similar 
preferences, i.e., in a “common value” environment (Osborne & Turner, 2010). However, 
the abstention of less informed voters also strengthens the power of well-organized inter-
est groups and can lead to outcomes that are not necessarily welfare-enhancing if the atti-
tudes towards an initiative differ across groups of potential voters.  
NIMBYism (“not in my backyard”), which often complicates the allocation of socially bene-
ficial facilities with negative localized effects (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, & Eichenberger, 
1996), is one manifestation of this phenomenon. Opposition to NIMBY projects is fre-
quently observed to be driven by one well-informed and engaged group: homeowners 
(Fischel, 2001b). Capitalization effects on residential property prices, which have been 
well documented for local public goods since Oates (1969), offer one compelling explana-
tion. Because their houses are the single most important assets for the majority of home-
owners, this group can be hypothesized to support initiatives that they expect to increase 
the values of their properties and oppose those that do not. This is the homevoter hypoth-
esis (Fischel, 2001a). A recent strand of the literature has provided evidence that project-
ed house price capitalization effects significantly influence the degree of support for public 
initiatives and projects (Ahlfeldt, 2011; Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; Brunner, Sonstelie, & 
Thayer, 2001; Dehring, Depken, & Ward, 2008; Hilber & Mayer, 2009).  
The literature, however, has paid less attention to the role renters play in (spatial) political 
bargaining and how their tenure status affects their voting decisions. Property prices and 
rents are expected to follow similar trends, at least in the medium term. Increasing rents 
force residents to reduce their housing or non-housing consumption or to move to new 
neighborhoods. The resulting displacement pressures have frequently been analyzed in 
the interdisciplinary gentrification literature, mostly utilizing qualitative methods (see, 
e.g., Freeman & Braconi, 2004; Lees, 2000; Marcuse, 1986; Vigdor, 2002). As argued by 
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 Ahlfeldt (2011), assuming heterogeneous preferences and imperfect mobility, an increase 
in neighborhood quality should lead to a rent increase that drives renters out of their con-
sumption optima and reduces their utility. By analyzing voting behavior in the context of a 
public referendum on a large-scale urban development project within a rental environ-
ment, Ahlfeldt demonstrated that 1) expected higher home prices were opposed by the 
local population formed by renters and 2) renters engaged in massive opposition to a pro-
ject that was widely expected to appreciate the neighborhood. Hence, the theoretical im-
plications of the capitalization effect on political activism differ for homeowner and renter 
environments and are ambiguous in mixed-tenure environments. 
If homevoters (voters who own their homes) and leasevoters (voters who lease their 
homes) differ significantly in the way in which they respond to anticipated capitalization 
effects, there may be important implications for the allocation of local public goods or bads 
through processes of direct democracy. Whereas landlords would presumably respond to 
anticipated capitalization effects in the same way as homeowners, the renters of their 
properties eventually cast votes in public referenda in a given locality, as described by 
Cellini et al. (2010). We argue that the capitalization effect on the voting behavior of the 
leasevoter deserves special attention because it mitigates their incentives to vote accord-
ing to the distribution of (expected) welfare effects. Therefore, in mixed-tenure environ-
ments, a spatial voting pattern does not necessarily reflect the net distribution of positive 
and negative amenity changes, which makes it difficult to infer the actual welfare implica-
tions of proposed projects from the results of public referenda. 
We use a 2008 public referendum on the Tempelhof Airport in Berlin, Germany, as a natu-
ral experiment and a means to evaluate whether and to what extent the strength and the 
direction of anticipated capitalization effects on political activism depend on the local ten-
ure mix. Partly because of its history, Berlin possessed three relatively small airports in 
the early 1990s. Tegel Airport and Tempelhof Airport are centrally located within the 
boundaries of the former West Berlin, whereas Schoenefeld Airport lies close to the south-
eastern boundary of Berlin and served East Berlin during the division period. On July 4, 
1996, it was decided to redevelop Schoenefeld Airport into a large-scale, international hub 
airport, named Berlin–Brandenburg International Airport, where all air traffic would be 
concentrated.  
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 As the closure of the Tempelhof Airport, scheduled for October 31, 2008, approached, the 
intensity of the protests against the plan steadily increased. The Interest Group for City 
Airport Tempelhof eventually forced a referendum in favor of Tempelhof’s remaining in 
operation. Although the results of the referendum were nonbinding for Berlin’s city gov-
ernment, it was widely agreed that the referendum, if it had succeeded, would have exert-
ed strong pressure on the city government, which would thus have been forced to rethink 
its decision (Nitsch, 2009). Because the extension of Schoenefeld was conditional on the 
closure of the two city airports, the voters essentially had to choose between the old air-
port concept (three airports) and a new airport concept (one airport). The vote was held 
on April 27, 2008. The referendum was approved by a majority of those who voted, but it 
failed to achieve the minimum favorable vote quorum of 25% of the total electorate. More 
detailed information on the history of Berlin’s airports and the Tempelhof referendum is 
provided by Nitsch (2009) and in the web appendix. 
This referendum provides us with rich variation in local costs and benefits because it was 
directly or indirectly connected to three airfields distributed across the city area. Another 
useful feature of the study area is that the Berlin housing market exhibits a large degree of 
spatial variation in terms of its tenure structure. We use the spatial variation in airport 
effects and tenure structure to detect tenure interaction effects in precinct-level voting 
patterns using a two-step strategy. In the first step, we provide evidence for tenure-
specific heterogeneity in the way in which changes in the spatial distribution of 
(dis)amenities impact local voting behavior. We find that a similar positive or negative 
amenity change induces a voting response in a homeowner neighborhood that is four 
times as large as in a renter neighborhood. In the second step, we construct a measure of 
local pecuniary capitalization effects to separate the tenure capitalization interaction ef-
fect from the technological externality effects and amenity effects. We infer the price signal 
from a difference-in-difference analysis of the announcement effect on property prices. 
Again, we find consistent evidence of the positive interaction effect of local homeowner-
ship rates and price signals on the support for the new airport concept.  
These results consistently indicate that leasevoter behavior differs substantially from 
homevoter behavior. Perhaps more important, these findings indicate that a vote on public 
facilities with localized effects does not take place in a “common value” environment, so 
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 allocation decisions may be better based on (stated preference-based) cost–benefit anal-
yses (Osborne & Turner, 2010).  
Section 2 of this paper discusses tenure interaction effects that potentially shape voting 
decisions theoretically. Our empirical strategy is presented in Section 3. Section 4 de-
scribes the data, including how our measures of the local homeownership rates and price 
signals were constructed. Our main findings are presented and discussed in Section 5, and 
conclusions are presented in Section 6. Details concerning the data, as well as complemen-
tary evidence and technical details, are provided in a web-based technical appendix.  
2.  Leasevoter and homevoter incentives 
This section discusses the incentives leasevoters and homevoters face in referenda on 
policies with local effects. To isolate the tenure-specific component in the incentives, we 
decomposed the expected utility effects associated with local policies into amenity (direct 
utility effects) and capitalization (adjustments in rents and house prices) effects.  
Leasevoter 
Assume an individual who is mobile across city neighborhoods and whose utility in a given 
neighborhood is defined with respect to the consumption of housing services H and an 
arbitrary local amenity Z that varies across space.  
    ( (      
  
  
   
  
  
     
The individual spends a fixed housing budget  ̅     on housing services rented at a 
rental market price r. This formulation is in line with housing expenditure shares that tend 
to be relatively constant across population groups and geographies (Davis & Ortalo-
Magné, 2011). The demand for housing is defined as follows: 
  
 ̅
 
 
  
  
    
Given the fixed budget, higher rents indirectly reduce utility by reducing housing con-
sumption. To keep the renter indifferent between different levels of the amenity at differ-
ent locations, the rent must adjust to offset the amenity effect.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ̃
  ̃
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  ̃
  
     (1) 
5
 where   ̃    represents the individual’s willingness to pay for changes in the amenity 
level, similar to an implicit (hedonic) price (Rosen, 1974). For a situation to be a spatial 
equilibrium, all individuals in the urban economy must be unable to improve their utility 
by moving across neighborhoods.  
The utility effect of an exogenous change in local amenity levels is defined by the total de-
rivative:  
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  (2) 
We focus on the discussion of positive amenity changes, but the implications hold by anal-
ogy for negative changes as well. As is evident from equation (2), the change in amenity dZ 
affects the utility of the individual via two channels. First, the change in amenity dZ has a 
direct impact on utility, triggered by the positive valuation of the amenity by the individual 
(      ; the amenity effect. Second, the change in amenity dZ has an indirect effect that 
stems from an adjustment in market rent to the amenity change (      ; the capitaliza-
tion effect. This increase in market rent, which is driven by spatial competition and re-
stores the spatial equilibrium, forces the individual to reduce housing consumption at the 
same location. In a world with homogenous preferences, the market adjustment will re-
flect the renter’s own valuation of the amenity, i.e.,          ̃    . Put differently, posi-
tive expected amenity effects will be offset by capitalization effects (increases in market 
rent). Given (1), the individual will therefore be indifferent to changes in the amenity.  
   
 
   
     (3) 
If, however, there are heterogeneous preferences for different amenity levels, a positive 
change in the local amenity should attract renters with higher amenity preferences 
            , so that the adjustment in the market rent will be larger than the valua-
tion by the incumbent renter,          ̃      [(      (     ̃   ̃    ]. If the renter 
stays put, the reduction in housing consumption triggered by the higher market rent will 
more than compensate for the amenity effect from the higher amenity level. With signifi-
cant mobility costs (the costs of moving house and the loss of social and cultural capital, 
among other costs), the individual will not be able to restore the previous utility level by 
moving to another neighborhood with the preferred mix of rent and amenity levels. Hence, 
        . The negative effect of increased rents reduces utility and lead to leasevoter 
opposition to “positive” local amenity changes.  
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 Conversely, if rental regulations protect the renter from rent increases, the adjustment in 
market rent may less than fully compensate the incumbent renter for the amenity effect, 
i.e., 
  
  
    ̃     and 
   
  
  .  
To summarize, compared to the benchmark scenario of free markets and homogenous 
preferences, heterogeneous preferences decrease and rental regulations increase the like-
lihood that a leasevoter will support a positive amenity change, if we assume that the pro-
pensity to vote in favor of the amenity change strictly increases in the expected utility 
change. 
Homevoter 
The utility of home owners can be expressed as follows: 
  
   (  (    ̅        
where  ̅  is the net rent after tax for which owners can potentially rent out their homes. In 
countries with no taxation of the benefit of owner-occupied living (and no tax reduction 
for the costs of owner-occupied living), the net rent in equilibrium is  ̅   . The budget 
constraint now takes the following form: 
 ̅   ̅  ̅   ̅       
where  ̅ is a fixed periodic mortgage payment equal to the budget available for housing 
services ( ̅   ̅  and  ̅  is the amount of housing services owned. The actual housing 
services H consumed, in principle, can vary in the rates at which housing services can be 
rented ( ) or rented out ( ̅  , should the owner decide to become a landlord and live in a 
location other than where their property is located. If the owner stays in the same neigh-
borhood (or in his or her own property), the budget equation can be simplified to ̅   ̅, 
and the consumption of housing services is fixed at H= ̅. 
   
 ̅  ̅
  
 
 ̅ 
  
 ̅, 
  
  
   
  
  ̅
    
Note that at a given location, an owner faces the same amenity effect (Z) as a renter, so 
that  (       [(      (     ̃ ]    ̃    defines the valuation of the amenity. Thus, 
the following equilibrium condition holds: 
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In the case of owners, unlike the case of renters, the (potential) capitalization effect for the 
owner induced by an amenity change dZ is a composite effect resulting from a change in 
rent paid for housing serves and a change in rent received from renting out a property.  
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   (5) 
If owners live in their own properties, they neither pay nor receive rent, and the utility 
effect is exclusively determined by the positive amenity effect.1 The same applies if the 
property is rented out and preferences are homogenous (        ̃      ̅    . 
There is no incentive to leave the neighborhood because the effects of increases in rent 
paid and received on housing consumption simply cancel each other out, i.e., 
(     (       ̅(    ⁄  :  
   
   
 
  
   
   (6a) 
Note that positive composite of amenity and capitalization effects differs from the situa-
tion in which the individual does not own a property and receives no net benefit (3). 
If an owner, in response to a local amenity change, decides to move to a neighborhood 
with the initial amenity (Z) and rent (r) levels of the original neighborhood, there will be 
no amenity effect (      and no impact on the (implicit) rent paid (    ), but there 
will be an expected benefit from an increase in the market rent received from the property 
rented out.  
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   (6b) 
which, as defined in (4), is equivalent to the amenity effect       in a world with homog-
enous preferences because 
  ̃
  
 
  ̅
  
.  
If, however, preferences are heterogeneous and the change in the local rent level following 
the amenity change is larger than the valuation of the amenity (  ̅      ̃    , the 
owner will receive a benefit from positive amenity changes above and beyond the pure 
                                                             
1  The effects on rents also cancel each other out if the owner becomes a landlord but decides to 
rent within the same neighborhood. 
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 amenity effect. The effect can be decomposed into a quasi-amenity effect       that is 
equivalent to an increase in rent, according to the valuation ((      (     ̃ (  ̃    ), 
and an additional utility effect that originates from the immigration of renters with higher 
valuations ((      (     ̅ ((  ̅    ̃    )): 
   
  
 
  
  
  
  ̃
  ̃
   
 
  
  
  
  ̅
(
  ̅
   
 
  ̃
   
)   (7) 
The second term captures a genuine capitalization benefit, i.e., an increase in utility that 
stems from an increase in wealth and is in addition to the direct amenity effect.  
Assuming that the propensity to vote in favor of positive amenity changes strictlyincreases 
in the expected net utility change, owners will likely vote for positive amenity changes. In 
a world with homogenous preferences, this will essentially be a vote on the amenity effect. 
Owners, in addition, will benefit from a capitalization benefit in a world with heterogene-
ous preferences if the wealth effect is large relative to mobility costs, making it even more 
likely that they support positive amenity changes.  
Leasevoter homevoter comparison 
Equations (2) and (7) define the utility effect for an individual in different tenure scenari-
os. The conditions can be combined to derive testable implications for the empirical analy-
sis of voting behavior in public referenda. We proposed two strategies to model the ex-
pected utility effect as a function of the interaction of the tenure status on the one hand 
and the amenity effect and/or capitalization effects on the other 
In the case of homogenous preferences, combining equations (1) and (2) yields a renter net 
utility effect of zero: 
   
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
     (8) 
For owners who live in their own properties, the resulting utility effect is simply the amen-
ity effect: 
 
   
  
 
  
  
.  
For owners who become landlords and rent a flat elsewhere, the same result applies be-
cause the amenity effect attached to the property transforms into a capitalization effect of 
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 the same size. The expected utility effect of leasevoters and homevoters can therefore be 
expressed as a function of the amenity effect and the tenure status.  
   
   
 
  
   
       {
           
 
           
  (9) 
Equation (9), the first of the two proposed tenure interaction equations, implies a positive 
interaction of the amenity effect and being a homeowner (or landlord) because owners are 
hedged against rent increases. Either they pay no rent at all or they benefit from increases 
in the rents received for renting out their own property. Owners should therefore support 
(oppose) any initiative more strongly than renters that is expected to improve (worsen) 
the amenity level of their neighborhood. This implication is consistent with the homevoter 
hypothesis. The positive interaction effect generalizes to the heterogeneous preferences 
case because the renter interaction effect, if anything, becomes negative, and the owner 
interaction effect must be positive as long as 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  ̅
(
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  ̃
  
).  
Equation (9) can be tested using measures of ownership and positive (proximity) or nega-
tive (noise) airport effects that are relatively easily accessible. From this amenity tenure 
interaction effect, however, it is not possible to conclude to which extent heterogeneous 
preferences shape voting patterns. It remains unclear whether leasevoters and homevot-
ers holding the amenity effect constant oppose or support the capitalization effects de-
scribed in the section above. 
To address these questions, our second empirical approach models capitalization effects 
explicitly. Equation (2) defines how changes in the rental price level associated with amen-
ity changes affect the utility of a renter. The capitalization benefit ((      (      (   
   ) is expected to be negative as long as renters are not fully protected against (positive) 
rent adjustments. The corresponding situation for the owner is defined in (6). The effect of 
capitalization on expected utility depends on the valuation by the marginal renter or buyer 
moving into the neighborhood subsequent to the amenity change relative to the valuation 
by the established owners. Because the willingness to pay for a higher amenity level of 
those moving into the neighborhood after a positive adjustment will, if anything, be higher 
than the willingness of the incumbents ((  ̅   ⁄   (  ̃               ), the capitaliza-
tion benefit to the owner must be non-negative. The capitalization benefit is also non-
negative for negative amenity changes, due to the potential immigration of individuals 
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 with lower amenity preferences ((  ̅   ⁄   (  ̃              ). The capitalization ben-
efit (excluding the amenity effect) is therefore strictly non-positive for renters and non-
negative for owners. Combining equations (2) and (5), the capitalization tenure interac-
tion effect is necessarily positive for the owner relative to the renter status as long as 
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  (10) 
Equation (10), the second of the two proposed tenure interaction equations, separates the 
effects related to capitalization from an amenity effect. The latter is identical for renters 
and owners and should reflect the (spatial) distribution of costs and benefits of an amenity 
change. The effects of capitalization on expected utilities, however, quantitatively and 
qualitatively depend on the tenure status. 
In the case of positive amenity changes, capitalization has a negative impact on renter util-
ity unless these are perfectly protected against rent increases. This is a potentially rele-
vant scenario in many European countries where rental regulations constrain rent in-
creases for existing contracts and restrict the termination of rental contracts by landlords, 
while allowing rents to be freely set for new contracts (vacancy decontrol).3 The capitali-
zation effect can dominate the amenity effect in a scenario with heterogeneous prefer-
ences and positive relocation costs.  
The capitalization effect on the homeowner is positive if preferences are heterogeneous 
(and the benefits exceed relocation costs) or zero otherwise. For positive amenity changes, 
amenity and capitalization effects will work in the same direction and in the opposite di-
rection as the renter capitalization effect. 
                                                             
2  From the indirect demand function       ̅    ̅ we know that         ̅        ̅, 
where  ̅     in the initial situation. 
3  For an overview of rental regulations in the case of Germany, cf. Usinger (2012), esp. 125f. Cruz 
(2009) provides an overview of rental regulations in some 40 countries worldwide, using a wide 
range of measures. In the US, rent controls of various types were more widespread in the past, 
but have been abandoned, with few exceptions. Cf. Sims (2007) regarding the lessons to be 
learned from the end of rent control in Massachusetts. 
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 3.  Empirical strategy 
In the previous section, we presented the expected utility effects of local amenity changes 
by tenure and described why homevoter and leasevoter behavior should be reflected by 
an interaction of amenity and capitalization effects with tenure. This section presents our 
two-part empirical strategy for estimating the tenure interaction effects described in 
equations (9) and (10).  
3.1 Amenity tenure interaction effects 
We start from the assumption that voters who participate in a public referendum vote to 
support the alternative that maximizes their expected utility. We further assume that the 
probability of a voter voting for an alternative increases with the expected net benefit that 
an initiative offers. Adopting a standard linear probability model (e.g., Dehring, et al., 
2008) we set up our first empirical test as an empirical derivative of equation (9), as fol-
lows:  
       ∑                (     )      (11) 
The support for the new airport project (SUP) is expressed as the percentage of “no” votes 
at total votes in voting precinct j. Unlike in the simplified theoretical environment dis-
cussed in the previous section, voters in reality differ in various ways that can affect their 
attitudes towards aviation. To capture the effects of the socio-demographic composition of 
the local voters on the expected utility of the new aviation concept and hence the voting 
outcome, we add a set of k control variables Xk, which are discussed in the data section. 
Controlling for these effects, we assume that SUP is a function of the local environmental 
impact Ej, which serves as a proxy for the amenity effect, and an interaction effect of Ej and 
the local homeownership rate Hj. Because we expect the spatial distribution of costs and 
benefits related to all of the airports to affect voting behavior, we set up Ej as a composite 
of six variables capturing the potentially countervailing proximity costs and benefits of 
noise exposure (NF) and accessibility (AF) to airport services provided by the three air-
ports (   ∑ (           )    {                           }).     controls for 
voting behavior that depends on tenure but is unrelated to the amenity–tenure interaction 
effect. In an extension, we introduce a full set of interaction terms for socio-demographic 
characteristics to accommodate tenure-specific heterogeneity in observable household 
characteristics (∑          ).    is a zero-mean stochastic error term. We identify all 
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 parameters                   in a one-stage nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimation 
procedure. Using the parameters  ̂ and  ̂  from the one-stage NLS model, we also esti-
mate a nonparametric variant of the amenity–tenure interaction effect using locally 
weighted regressions. Details are provided in the appendix. 
3.2 Capitalization tenure interaction effects 
Our second empirical test is an empirical implementation of equation (10) and includes a 
homeownership–capitalization interaction effect. To capture the capitalization effect em-
pirically, we introduce a local price signal associated with the new airport concept Sj. 
Compared to specification (11), we then replace the amenity–homeownership rate 
(     interaction term with a price signal–homeownership rate interaction term 
(     to allow for tenure-specific heterogeneity in the capitalization effect on expected 
utility and voting behavior. 
       ∑                    (     )      (12) 
Specification (12) represents the second stage in a two-stage estimation procedure, the 
first stage of which consists of an estimation of a price signal Sj, as described in more detail 
in the next section. The parameters in the second stage,                      , can be 
estimated using OLS. To comply with the properties described above, the interaction term 
( ) must be positive (i.e., the marginal effects of the price signal must increase with the 
homeownership rate). The terms    ,    , and  (     ) jointly form a surface along the 
homeownership rate H and price signal S dimensions, with the third dimension being the 
capitalization effect on voting behavior (         (     )). Positive capitalization 
benefits at high homeownership rates (controlling for the amenity effect) are indicative of 
anticipated wealth effects that can be realized by relocation following anticipated amenity 
changes, if preferences for locations are heterogeneous.  
We also estimate an augmented version of equation (12) that includes the interactive 
terms of homeownership rate and the socio-demographic characteristics (∑        
  )  as well as a full set of airport homeownership rate interactive terms (   
∑ (             ) ), to disentangle tenure-specific heterogeneity in airport effects 
(amenity effects) from tenure-specific heterogeneity in the effect of capitalization. In addi-
tion to a range of robustness tests of equation (12), we set up a semi-parametric variant to 
relax the parametric constraints in the homeownership rate–capitalization interaction. 
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 Essentially, we replace the parametric surface specification (         (     )) 
with a set of fixed effects (∑ ∑    (           . We group precincts into grid cells 
(         with similar Hj and Sj values, for each of which we then estimate a fixed effect. 
Recovering and plotting the fixed effects yields a nonparametric homeownership rate–
price signal surface estimated conditionally on the linear baseline model. A more detailed 
description is provided in the web appendix. 
The empirical strategy outlined above depends on the use of appropriate proxy variables 
for airport noise (NF), airport accessibility (AF), homeownership (H), and price signal (S). 
Data are not typically readily available for these variables. Using an approach similar to 
Dehring et al. (2008), we assume that the property market reaction to the initial 1996 an-
nouncement of the reorganization of the airports serves as a (noisy) signal to voters about 
the market valuation of the new air transport concepts. We estimate this signal using an 
auxiliary hedonic difference-in-difference property price regression for which the chal-
lenge is to develop a specification that can accommodate the complex spatial pattern asso-
ciated with increases and decreases in the noise levels and accessibility of the three air-
ports spread across the metropolitan area. The procedure is described in section 4.3. 
4.  Data 
This section discusses the data sources used and the procedure used to generate our proxy 
variables for local homeownership rates and price signals. A more detailed account of the 
methods used to compile our data set is presented in the web-based technical appendix.  
4.1 Basic data 
Data from 1,201 precincts on the results of the voting on the Tempelhof referendum were 
obtained from the statistical office of Berlin–Brandenburg on a disaggregated basis. Of the 
881,035 votes that were cast, 230,571 were cast by mail and could not be considered be-
cause of missing geographic data.4 The voting precincts form our main analysis unit ac-
cording to which all of the other data were organized using a geographic information sys-
tem (GIS), the framework of the Urban and Environmental Information System of the Sen-
                                                             
4 Nitsch (2009) shows that the differences by district were negligible when comparing votes cast 
at ballot boxes and by mail. 
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 ate Department of Berlin (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006b), and 
standard area interpolation techniques (Arntz & Wilke, 2007; Goodchild & Lam, 1980). All 
of the distance computations were made using this GIS framework. 
An official report (Laermkartierung nach Umgebungsrichtline, 09.07.2007) was used to 
obtain detailed information on the exposure to aircraft noise from Tegel airport at the 
level of 10 × 10-m grid cells. Noise levels are recorded for all developed properties within 
the Tegel air corridor and are expressed using a long-term sound pressure index (Lden) 
that is equivalent to the standard log-decibel scale (db). For Tempelhof, similar data were 
obtained from the Berlin airport’s operating company. The noise data were available in the 
form of an electronic map that distinguishes between various zones of similar sound pres-
sure. For Schoenefeld, which lies outside the boundaries of Berlin and whose air corridor 
only partly crosses Berlin’s territory, the best available information was a map of the noise 
abatement zone (Laermschutzzone), which anticipates the expected increase in noise lev-
els upon the opening of the new Berlin–Brandenburg International Airport. 
Fig. 1 shows the locations of the three airports relative to the central business district 
(CBD) and illustrates the areas associated with values greater than 45 db. Note that only 
aircraft noise exceeding this threshold is considered in the empirical analyses. Lower lev-
els of aircraft noise are likely to be dominated by other noise sources (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 
2011). Finally, detailed information on socio-demographic characteristics, including popu-
lation, age groups, the proportions of males and non-German individuals, the unemploy-
ment rate among non-German citizens and the outcome of the 2006 state elections were 
available from the statistical office in Berlin. We complemented these data from the official 
records with estimates of the purchasing power per capita (at the post code level) derived 
from a report by the Consumer Research Society (Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung).  
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 Fig 1.   Noise measures 
 
Notes: An illustration based on the Urban Environmental Information System (Senatsverwaltung 
für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006b). 
4.2 Homeownership rate 
In selecting a proxy variable that we can use to approximate the homeownership rate at 
the precinct level, we profit from a particularity of the Berlin housing market: the segmen-
tation of the market into 1) detached, semidetached and attached single-family houses, 
villas and townhouses that are almost entirely occupied by owners, and 2) typical down-
town apartment buildings, which are usually five stories tall and are almost entirely occu-
pied by renters.  
It is well documented that accommodation type is an important determinant of tenure 
choice across European countries (Hilber, 2007), but this segregation is striking in Ger-
many and particularly in Berlin. An analysis of the 2002 microcensus (a 1% population 
sample) reveals that more than 90% of one- and two-family houses are owner occupied, 
whereas more than 90% of dwellings in three-or-more family buildings are inhabited by 
renters (see the web-appendix for more detail). 
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 The Urban Environmental Information System developed by the Senate Department 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006a) indicates a building structure of 
15,937 largely homogenous statistical blocks. Using this information, the homeownership 
rate (H) for a voting precinct can be approximated as the proportion of the total popula-
tion above the age of 18 (the electorate) that lives within the boundaries of a statistical 
block of one- or two-family houses. We test this procedure by computing the homeowner-
ship rates for the 12 city districts (Bezirke) and comparing them to actual owner occupan-
cy data available at this level. A linear regression of actual and estimated values yields an 
R2 of slightly more than 0.75.5 Details regarding the institutional setting, the estimation 
procedure and the evaluation are provided in the web-based technical appendix. 
4.3 Price signal 
To proxy for the price effects associated with the new Berlin airport concept, we exploit 
the fact that the new airport concept was announced on July 4, 1996, in the consensus de-
cision (Konsensbeschluss), well in advance of the 2008 referendum. In line with Brunner et 
al. (2001), Dehring et. al. (2008), and Ahlfeldt (2011), we assume that at the time of the 
referendum, the adjustments in property prices that followed this announcement provid-
ed a price signal to homeowners (and renters) regarding the market valuation of a concen-
tration of air traffic at the Schoenefeld site. Approval of the plans would have implied that 
the capitalization effects would remain persistent or be strengthened if the announcement 
effects were initially discounted on uncertainty. An abandonment of the plans instead 
would have implied that the anticipated capitalization effects would be reversed. We esti-
mated this signal using an auxiliary hedonic property price analysis of 6,796 transactions 
of developed residential properties that took place within one year before and after the 
day of the announcement in question.6  
                                                             
5  Imputations of variables that are not directly observable are popular in the housing economics 
literature. As an example, Arévalo and Ruiz-Castillo (2006) showed that market rents can be rea-
sonably well approximated using information on the location and quality of housing..  
6 We also estimated the price effects of later announcements regarding the new airport concept 
but found that the adjustment was more significant for 1996 than for any later date. The data set 
contains all transactions related to developed residential land that took place in this period. Rel-
atively few observations had to be excluded from the full record because of missing values for 
crucial characteristics. No signs of sample selection bias were found. 
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 Our estimation equation is a combined hedonic (Rosen, 1974) and difference-in-
differences specification. We investigate the effect of a treatment (the announcement of a 
new airport concept) while controlling for unobserved spatial heterogeneity and identify 
the treatment effect by comparing property prices before and after the announcement in 
different locations within the city. The basic structure of our identification strategy corre-
sponds to a standard difference-in-difference setting: 
   (                            
 ∑        ∑        ∑         (             (14) 
where     is the transaction price of property i at time t;        is a treatment measure 
that captures the change in the spatial distribution of aircraft noise and airport accessibil-
ity associated with the new air traffic concept; and       is an indicator variable denoting 
the period after the announcement, so that               differentiates between the 
effects of the treatment measure before and after the announcement. The remaining terms 
capture observable hedonic property characteristics (∑       ) and location characteris-
tics (∑         and unobserved time-invariant location characteristics within each of the 
voting precincts (the fixed effects, SBj).7  (        is a third-order polynomial for a daily 
time trend.     is a random error term. The treatment effect of the announcement of the 
new airport concept on property transaction prices is identified by        .8 
To develop a treatment measure TREAT that can accommodate the complex spatial pat-
tern of price adjustments associated with the increase and decrease in noise levels and 
accessibility of the three airports distributed across the metropolitan area, we proceed as 
follows. First, we define three auxiliary coordinate systems with horizontal axes that fol-
low the runway paths of each airport F, with the vertical axes standing upright in the cen-
ters of the airfields. Second, we attach the XFi and YFi coordinates in each of the three auxil-
iary coordinate systems (F) to all property transactions i. Third, we generate a set of spa-
tial variables based on these coordinates. For each airport coordinate system F, we define 
                                                             
7  Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level. 
8  Note that unlike in the conventional difference-in-difference setting, our treatment measure 
TREAT captures a spatially varying treatment across the entire metropolitan area (and not an ef-
fect that is specific to a treatment group). The               effect therefore incorporates a 
potential level shift across the entire metropolitan area that in a standard setting would be con-
trolled for by including a non-interacted POST variable. 
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 third-order polynomials of the absolute value of the X-coordinate (|   | |   |
  |   |
  , the 
Y-coordinate (|   | |   |
  |   |
   and the X×Y-coordinate interaction (|       | |    
   |
  |       |
    Fourth, we define our treatment measure TREAT as a linear combina-
tion of the resulting 27 variables, which we substitute into (14) to obtain our estimation 
equation.  
   (     (∑ ∑ [   |   |
     |   |
     |       |
 ]              
 ∑ ∑ [   |   |
     |   |
     |       |
 ]       
        ∑        ∑        ∑             (15). 
The estimated coefficients ( ̂  ), which are jointly highly statistically significant in a Wald 
test, can then be used to generate our proxy for the price signal at the precinct level: 
   (∑ ∑ [   |   |
 
    |   |
 
    |       |
 
]     ), where     and     are defined 
by analogy with     and     but with reference to the geographic centroid of precinct j. 
Table A2 in the web-based technical appendix summarizes the results of the estimation of 
Eq. (15). Fig. 2 shows the estimated market reaction against the backdrop of the auxiliary 
coordinate systems. The map generally reveals positive price responses along the air cor-
ridors for the airports that were announced to be closing (Tempelhof and Tegel) and a 
negative reaction along the corridor for the airport that was to be expanded (Schoenefeld). 
The exceptions are a few precincts that are immediately adjacent to the city boundary and 
the existing runways of Schoenefeld, where the disutility from air noise may have exceed-
ed a critical value and where further increases may therefore only have had a marginal 
impact. The positive amenity effect of having a state-of-the-art international airport near-
by could therefore outweigh the negative disamenity (noise) effect. Such proximity effects 
would be consistent with the general appreciation in property values in the southeastern 
locations near the new airport but outside the air corridor. Consistent with our supposi-
tions, the results reflect the existence of costs related to aircraft noise and benefits related 
to airport accessibility. More details regarding the data and methods used are presented in 
the web appendix.  
The estimated announcement effects are plausible with respect to the historical setting 
and potential sorting effects. A detailed discussion is presented in the web appendix (Sec-
tion 3.3), along with the results of a series of placebo regressions that support the chosen 
announcement date. It should further be noted that the strategy presented is not designed 
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 to provide an estimate of the total welfare effect of the new airport concept. Such com-
bined hedonic and difference-in-difference strategies have been criticized for not appro-
priately accounting for general equilibrium effects of non-marginal environmental chang-
es (e.g., Sieg & Zhang, 2012; Tra, 2010). Instead, the strategy is designed to flexibly identify 
spatially varying appreciation rates and produce a measure of relative appreciation within 
the city area. 
Fig 2.  The estimated price signal (1996 announcement) 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations and illustration. Solid black lines represent the auxiliary coordinate 
systems. Classes are defined based on Jenk’s (1977) algorithm.  
5.  Results 
5.1 Baseline results 
Fig. 3 maps the proportions of “no” votes in the referendum on the continued operation of 
Tempelhof. A striking level of east–west heterogeneity is evident from the map. The (un-
conditional) mean approval rate is more than twice as great within the former East Berlin 
as it is within the former West Berlin (65% vs. 30%). Similarly impressive is the clearly 
reduced support for the new concept within the Schoenefeld noise zone (27%), whereas 
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 the increases in the approval rates around Tegel and Tempelhof are visible but less obvi-
ous. The effects in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft noise zones are indicative of 
NIMBYism and the desire to shift (Tempelhof and Tegel) or keep (Schoenefeld) airport 
activity away from the voters’ own neighborhoods. 
Fig 3.  Support for the new airport concept (SUP) 
 
Notes: Authors’ illustration based on the Urban and Environmental Information System of the 
Senate of Berlin (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006b). The classes are 
defined based on Jenk’s (1977) algorithm.  
Column I of Table 1, which shows the results of a reduced version of Eq. (11), substanti-
ates the impressions suggested by Fig. 3. Even with differences in socioeconomic controls 
taken into account, the rejection rate in the eastern precincts is higher by approximately 
29 percentage points. A 1-db increase in aircraft noise triggers an increase in the propor-
tion of “no” votes by approximately 0.9 percentage points for precinct affected by 
Tempelhof noise and approximately 0.2 percentage points in the case of Tegel. Given the 
maxima of the observed noise levels for the precinct average of approximately 14 db for 
Tempelhof and 30 db for Tegel (these values are in excess of the 45-db threshold), these 
estimates indicate a substantial increase in support for the new airport concept, i.e., up to 
13 (Tempelhof) and 7 (Tegel) percentage points. As expected, the effect of the Tegel air 
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 noise is weaker than that of the Tempelhof air noise because of the less direct connection 
of the former to the referendum, which directly addressed the closure of Tempelhof. The 
support for the new airport concept within the Schoenefeld noise zone is significantly re-
duced (32 percentage points lower) compared to the support for the project in the pre-
cincts with a similar socio-demographic structure within the boundaries of the former 
East Berlin. Without reference to local tenure status, these results indicate that aircraft 
noise was generally perceived as a disamenity by the local population.  
Column II adds a set of variables for distance to the airport terminals to disentangle the 
estimated noise effects from the accessibility effects. Support decreases by approximately 
0.9 percentage points for each 1-km reduction in distance to the Tempelhof airport. This 
result, which is identified in conjunction with a noise effect that is only slightly reduced, 
indicates that the expected gains from the alternative post-closure use of the space as a 
public park outweigh the expected loss of airport services. In contrast, the positive dis-
tance effect (0.34 percentage points per km) that was found for Tegel shows that the antic-
ipated loss of access to the services provided by the largest airport was expected to out-
weigh the potential benefits of an uncertain alternative use for the space. It is likely that 
the positive coefficient of the Schoenefeld distance variables partially captures the corre-
lated noise effects that cannot be observed directly (except through the binary noise pro-
tection zone dummy variable) and thus indicates the NIMBYism of voters attempting to 
avoid a concentration of air traffic in their neighborhoods.  
Like the results for aircraft noise and airport accessibility, the point estimates for the so-
cio-demographic control variables exhibit high degrees of stability across model specifica-
tions. The estimated difference in the average rejection rates for the former West Berlin 
and the former East Berlin is approximately 23–29 percentage points; history clearly mat-
ters. Our political variables also exhibit the expected signs, with increased support for 
Tempelhof (i.e., a lower share of “no” votes) in voting precincts with a high proportion of 
supporters of conservative parties and increased support for the new concept in precincts 
with more supporters of the Green party. The age variables reveal that support for the 
new concept was higher in all age groups relative to the baseline category of 27- to 45-
year-olds. Of the baseline controls, only purchasing power and the proportion of unem-
ployed individuals do not have a robust, significant impact.  
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 Tab 1.  Parametric estimates of proportion of “no” votes for continuation of 
Tempelhof (=support for new airport concept ) 
 Proportion of “no” votes out of the total votes (x100) (support for new airport 
concept) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
 OLS OLS NLS NLS OLS OLS 
(Former) East Berlin 
(dummy) 
29.121
***
 
(1.226) 
28.888
***
 
(1.229) 
25.908
***
 
(1.219) 
23.774
***
 
(1.426) 
26.045
***
 
(1.315) 
22.868
***
 
(1.475) 
Proportion conserva-
tive parties (x100) 
-0.658
***
 
(0.047) 
-0.671
***
 
(0.044) 
-0.835
***
 
(0.047) 
-0.967
***
 
(0.054) 
-0.804
***
 
(0.048) 
-0.945
***
 
(0.054) 
Proportion green 
party (x100) 
0.944
***
 
(0.047) 
0.822
***
 
(0.050) 
0.715
***
 
(0.047) 
0.737
***
 
(0.057) 
0.716
***
 
(0.052) 
0.719
***
 
(0.060) 
Proportion age < 18 
(x100) 
0.605
***
 
(0.066) 
0.715
***
 
(0.087) 
0.526
***
 
(0.072) 
0.570
***
 
(0.079) 
0.586
***
 
(0.092) 
0.480
***
 
(0.086) 
Proportion age 18–
27 (x100) 
0.914
***
 
(0.095) 
0.934
***
 
(0.114) 
0.750
***
 
(0.093) 
0.762
***
 
(0.104) 
0.795
***
 
(0.117) 
0.643
***
 
(0.108) 
Proportion age 45–
55 (x100) 
0.810
***
 
(0.076) 
0.827
***
 
(0.075) 
0.698
***
 
(0.072) 
0.634
***
 
(0.076) 
0.739
***
 
(0.078) 
0.590
***
 
(0.080) 
Proportion age >55 
(x100) 
0.601
***
 
(0.044) 
0.593
***
 
(0.049) 
0.495
***
 
(0.045) 
0.565
***
 
(0.053) 
0.519
***
 
(0.051) 
0.521
***
 
(0.054) 
Purch. power 
1000Euro/capita 
-0.072 
(0.196) 
0.347 
(0.215) 
0.264 
(0.182) 
0.103 
(0.208) 
0.274 
(0.214) 
-0.031 
(0.216) 
Proportion non-
Germans (x100) 
-0.058
*
 
(0.033) 
-0.161
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.118
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.133
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.142
***
 
(0.042) 
-0.092
***
 
(0.034) 
Proportion unem-
ployed (x100) 
-0.120 
(0.096) 
-0.070 
(0.105) 
-0.098 
(0.083) 
-0.223
**
 
(0.087) 
-0.086 
(0.101) 
-0.289
***
 
(0.095) 
Tempelhof noise 
(db) 
0.948
***
 
(0.195) 
0.844
***
 
(0.206) 
0.741
***
 
(0.123) 
0.690
***
 
(0.113) 
1.012
***
 
(0.204) 
0.984
***
 
(0.193) 
Tegel noise (db) 0.231
***
 
(0.038) 
0.271
***
 
(0.043) 
0.185
***
 
(0.034) 
0.166
***
 
(0.031) 
0.291
***
 
(0.042) 
0.260
***
 
(0.047) 
Schoenefeld noise 
zone (dummy) 
-32.307
***
 
(5.497) 
-27.068
***
 
(5.564) 
-7.904
***
 
(1.646) 
-4.989
***
 
(1.120) 
-29.937
***
 
(6.728) 
1.280 
(8.319) 
Distance to 
Tempelhof (km) 
 
 
-0.918
***
 
(0.130) 
-0.588
***
 
(0.098) 
-0.464
***
 
(0.091) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.122) 
-0.631
***
 
(0.133) 
Distance to Tegel 
(km) 
 
 
0.344
**
 
(0.135) 
0.182
***
 
(0.060) 
0.120
***
 
(0.049) 
0.232
*
 
(0.138) 
0.404
***
 
(0.133) 
Distance to Schoene-
feld (km) 
 
 
0.404
***
 
(0.090) 
0.252
***
 
(0.053) 
0.184
***
 
(0.046) 
0.337
***
 
(0.094) 
0.322
***
 
(0.112) 
Homeownership rate 
(H) (x100) 
 
 
 
 
0.057
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.206 
(0.224) 
0.066
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.238 
(0.255) 
H x amenity treat-
ment (   
 
 
 
 
0.027
***
 
(0.004) 
0.044
***
 
(0.005) 
 
 
 
 
Signal S from 1996 
announcement x100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.153
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.126
***
 
(0.040) 
Signal (S) x H ( )  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
0.002
***
 
(0.001) 
Controls x H     YES  YES 
Airport effects x H      YES 
Observations 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 
R
2
 0.906 0.913 0.920 0.928 0.918 0.930 
AIC 7839.1 7762.1 7644.2 7548.0 7697.1 7527.6 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
5.2 Amenity–tenure interaction effects 
Model III in Table 1 introduces the interaction of homeownership rate H and the joint ef-
fect of the noise N and accessibility A variables    (∑ (           ) ), as modeled by 
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 Eq. (11). In line with our theoretical expectations, the homeownership treatment interac-
tion effect (   is positive. Moreover, it is notable that the direction of the noise and dis-
tance effects does not change. When the joint effect of amenity changes and capitalization 
is considered, it appears that leasevoters (H=0) and homevoters (H=100) voted in the 
same direction. This is the theoretically expected result in an environment where regula-
tions mitigate increases in rents for renters as long as they remain in their residences, so 
the amenity effect outweighs the capitalization effect  
( 
  
  
 (
  
  
  
   ̃
)  
   ̃
  
 
   
  
). 
Nonetheless, the positive homeownership interaction effect indicates that the responses of 
homeowners to the treatment were considerably stronger. This finding is consistent with 
both (a) negative capitalization effects for renters (((      (      (      )   ), po-
tentially occurring with homogenous or heterogeneous preferences, and (b) positive capi-
talization effects for owners in a world with heterogeneous preferences ((      (   
   (  ̅      ̃      ). The amenity effect on the support for the new airport concept 
( ̂  ∑ (  ̂      ̂   ) ) increases by  =0.027 percentage points for every one per-
centage point increase in the homeownership rate H. Fig. 4 plots the amenity–tenure in-
teraction effect, comparing the linear estimate (   ) from Table 1 (III) with nonparamet-
ric locally weighted regression estimates using different bandwidths in the kernel weights 
(details are in the web-based appendix). The results indicate that compared to a baseline 
pure renter precinct (      ̂   ) the amenity voting effect is about four times as large 
in a precinct exclusively inhabited by owners (        ̂      in the parametric mod-
el). At the 1st (disamenity effects dominate) and 99th percentiles (amenity effects domi-
nate) of the joint amenity treatment  ̂  (∑ (  ̂      ̂   ) )  the homeowner effect 
decreases/increases the treatment effect from -4.24 to -15.67 (for the 1st percentile) and 
from 8.67 to 32.08 (for the 99th percentile) percentage points. These are sizable numbers, 
given the mean approval rate of approximately 30 percentage points in West Berlin.  
24
 Fig 4.  Amenity–tenure interaction effects: linear vs. nonparametric estimates 
 
Notes: Baseline model is model III in Table 1. (Details for the nonparametric locally weighted 
regression estimates using different bandwidths in the kernel weights are in the web-
based appendix). Bandwidths between 10 and 20 or 20 and 30 tend to produce a mix of 
the respective functional forms. 
Alterations and extensions 
It is noteworthy that the amenity–tenure interaction effect is robust to the inclusion of a 
full set of interaction terms of the homeownership rate and the control variables 
(∑       , which allows the homeowner effect to vary in all observable dimensions of 
the population. With these additional controls, the amenity interaction effect even in-
creases (column IV).  
To assess the quantitative relevance of the amenity effect and the amenity–tenure interac-
tion effect on the voting outcome, we have conducted a counterfactual analysis of what the 
voting outcome might have been without these localized incentives. We use a variant of 
model III, using the proportion of either “yes” votes or “no” votes at the total electorate 
(instead of total votes) as dependent variables. We introduce the airport variables in con-
junction with a full set of interaction terms of the airport variables and the homeowner-
ship rate, ∑ (                   ) . The counterfactual voting outcome is then 
computed as the actual voting outcome net of the contribution of the airport variables 
and/or the interaction terms. We find that while the amenity effects on the voting outcome 
were sizable in relative terms, given the low turnout, the minimum participation quorum 
(which the referendum failed to satisfy) made it unlikely that NIMBYists pushing for local 
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 improvements in environmental quality could cast a decisive vote.9 Details are in the web 
appendix. 
5.3 Capitalization–tenure interaction effects 
In column V, we proceed to the capitalization interaction model laid out in (12), using the 
price signal estimated according to (15). In line with the theoretical implications, the in-
teraction effect of the homeownership rate and the price signal is positive and statistically 
significant. Based on the parameter estimates (on H, S, S × H), the joint effect of homeown-
ership and the price signal (and their interaction) can be visualized on a quasi-spatial 3D 
surface (Fig. 4). Approximately 97% of our precinct-level price signal estimates fall within 
the range of ±15%. The percentage values are computed from log-differences estimated 
using model (15), applying the standard formula by Halvorsen & Palmquist (1980). A 
Wald test allows us to verify that the variables are not jointly equal to zero. Fig. 4 also 
compares the parametric estimate of the surface to a nonparametric version of the surface. 
This surface is computed by grouping precincts into cells in the homeownership rate price 
signal grid and replacing the parametric surface variables (H, S, S × H) by a set of fixed ef-
fects identifying these grid cells. The recovered fixed effects then form the nonparametric 
surface (details are in the web based appendix).  
There is significantly greater support for the new airport concept in areas with both high 
homeownership rates and positive price signals (in the northwestern quadrant). Com-
pared to a baseline precinct with a zero homeownership rate and a zero price signal, in a 
precinct with a homeownership rate of 100% and a positive price signal of approximately 
15%, the share of no votes, ceteris paribus, increases by approximately 9 percentage points 
in the parametric estimate. The effect, which is conditional on the amenity effect common 
to renters and owners, declines with both the price signal and the homeownership rate 
and becomes negative for locations with positive price signals but low homeownership 
rates. At a +15% price signal, a comparison between two otherwise comparable hypothet-
ical renter and homeowner precincts yields differences of approximately 12 percentage 
points in the linear model. Excluding two outliers, we find estimated price signals up to 
approximately 43%. At such price signal levels, the difference between two precincts that 
                                                             
9 As shown by Herrera and Mattozzi (2010), the participation quorum requirement may well have 
reduced the turnout.  
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 are fully renter- or owner-occupied amounts to approximately 20 percentage points. The 
nonparametric surface basically supports these insights. The renter effects are slightly 
stronger (in the southwestern quadrant), supporting the premise that controlling for 
amenity effects, renters tend to oppose the new airport concept if they expect their neigh-
borhoods to gentrify or property values to appreciate. At negative price signals, the capi-
talization treatment effects are somewhat smaller. In areas with low homeownership rates 
and negative price signals (in the southeastern quadrant), the effects are small but mostly 
positive, as expected. There also seems to be a capitalization-related benefit that mitigates 
the effects of negative environmental changes in areas with negative price signals and high 
homeownership rates (in the northeastern quadrant).  
These results are generally in line with the amenity capitalization models (columns III and 
IV), but add some important insights. The positive capitalization effect on homevoter be-
havior (at positive and negative price signals) indicates that heterogonous preferences 
play a role, and at least a proportion of homeowners takes potential wealth effects materi-
alizing with future relocations into account when making their voting decisions. Interest-
ingly, the capitalization effects for owners seem to be particularly relevant in areas with 
positive price signals. The negative capitalization effect on leasevoter behavior is in line 
with renters facing capitalization-related costs, even though the effects seem smaller in 
magnitude compared to the capitalization effect on homevoters. The difference can be 
explained by significant regulations that severely limit the degree to which landlords can 
adjust the rents that they charge for rented dwellings. An alternative or potentially com-
plementary explanation is the lower mobility costs faced by renters, which make it easier 
for them to readjust to accommodate their preferred combination of living costs and 
neighborhood quality by moving to another location.  
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 Fig 5.  Capitalization–tenure interaction effects on support for new concept  
(% of “no” votes 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates the homeownership–price signal interaction effect, based on the 
parametric Table 1, Column 5 estimates (linear, left) and a semi-parametric version (see 
the web-based appendix for details). The homeownership rate H, the price signal S and 
the treatment effect (on the Z-axis) are depicted in percentages.  
Model alterations and extensions 
In addition to the semi-parametric version illustrated in Fig. 4 (right panel), we performe a 
series of additional alterations of Model V in Table 1. We evaluate the extent to which the 
results are driven by outliers in the price signal variable and consider quadratic and cubic 
versions of the homeownership rate–price signal surface. Moreover, we use bootstrapped 
standard errors, regressions weighted by the precinct electorate, spatial error correction 
and lag models, measures for the distance to the airport terminals based on actual road 
distances rather than straight lines, and higher-order polynomial distance specifications. 
We have also substituted the dependent variable (the share of “no” votes) for the share of 
“no” or “yes” votes at the total electorate. All of the results, which are consistent with the 
discussions based on Table 1, Column V, are presented and discussed in the web appendix.  
We also estimate an extended version of Eq. (12) that features the interaction effects of 
the homeownership rate and both aircraft noise and airport access (E), as well as controls 
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 (Xk) from Table 1, Column IV. In this specification, we allow preferences with regard to 
noise and accessibility to differ for renters versus homeowners, and we separate these 
preferences from the voting effects related to price expectations. Again, the results are 
consistent with the above discussions of the benchmark model. In particular, the estimate 
of the homeownership rate–price signal interaction effect, which is of primary interest, 
remains close to the benchmark specification (Table 1, Column VI).  
6.  Conclusion 
We contribute to the literature that has investigated the political economy of collective 
decision making (e.g., Osborne & Turner, 2010) and especially the distinct incentives 
homeowners and renters face when participating in direct democracy. (Fischel, 2001a). 
The homevoter hypothesis states that homeowners vote in favor of initiatives that they 
perceive as increasing the value of their properties and against those that do not. This 
supposition has received empirical support (Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; Brunner, et al., 
2001; Dehring, et al., 2008; Hilber & Mayer, 2009) and is consistent with casual observa-
tions indicating that NIMBYs who engage in political activism against neighborhood 
change are often homeowners (Fischel, 2001b). While renters have received less attention 
in this context, capitalization effects are just as important if not more important to explain 
the attitudes of this group, unless they are perfectly protected from rental increases by 
regulation. Protests and conflicts associated with the gentrification of formerly deprived 
downtown areas are typical manifestations (Ahlfeldt, 2011).  
Our tests of tenure interaction effects accommodate both perspectives and directly com-
pare the behavior of homevoters to leasevoters. In analyzing a public initiative with local-
ized effects, we develop an empirical strategy that we uses to explore the interaction effect 
of the tenure mix of a neighborhood using either the net amenity change or a measure of 
capitalization effects. We used the 2008 public referendum on the closure of Tempelhof 
Airport in Berlin, Germany, as a natural experiment. The closure of the airport at 
Tempelhof (and the one at Tegel) was a logistical, ecological, and financial component of a 
new aviation concept that involved replacing the three existing smaller airports, Tegel, 
Tempelhof, and Schoenefeld, with a new international airport located close to the Schoen-
efeld site. The project had direct implications for voters living in the noise or catchment 
areas of the three airports. The change in Berlin’s airport geography, including the aircraft 
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 noise and airport accessibility effects associated with the three airports, was anticipated to 
generate amenity and capitalization effects with rich spatial variation. Given these factors 
and the substantial spatial variation in homeownership rates, this case offers an excellent 
opportunity to test for the presence of tenure-specific voting effects, i.e., homevoter and 
leasevoter behavior.  
Our parametric and nonparametric estimation strategies provide consistent evidence of 
the positive interaction effect of local homeownership rates, net amenity changes and 
price signals on the support for the new aviation concept. Consistent with our theoretical 
expectations, the marginal effects of homeownership rate on the one hand and the net 
amenity change or the estimated capitalization effect on the other positively depend on 
each other. Ceteris paribus, we find increased support for the new concept in locations 
with high homeownership rates and positive amenity and capitalization effects. The ef-
fects are significantly reduced in similarly positively affected areas inhabited by renters. 
Controlling for the amenity effect, we find evidence of increased opposition in areas with 
positive price signals and low homeownership rates. The fact that homeowners take into 
account a capitalization effect is consistent with heterogeneity in preferences for location 
across individuals, which lead to increases (decreases) in housing value in response to 
positive (negative) policies above (below) the own valuation. The fact that the capitaliza-
tion effect on renters turns out to be relatively small is consistent with strong regulations 
that shield renters from positive rent adjustments and the lower mobility costs faced by 
renters. This effect, however, may well vary across institutional settings.  
If the different incentives to engage in political bargaining that we find for renters and 
owners are also influential beyond our study area, there are important implications for the 
allocation of public facilities with localized effects and particularly for their allocation via 
direct democracy processes. Our results clearly suggest that individuals have diverse pref-
erences concerning (public) facilities with localized effects, which may suggest that deci-
sions regarding such facilities are better based on social cost-benefit analyses, especially 
those based on revealed preference approaches (e.g., using travel cost and hedonic data) 
(Osborne & Turner, 2010). In the long run, a political process based on referenda will not 
necessarily lead to the allocation of local public goods according to their welfare impact. 
Instead, it could lead to the concentration of public facilities with negative local externali-
ties (local public bads) in areas that are dominated by renters, whereas homeowners may 
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 attract facilities with positive local externalities (local public goods). There are, however, a 
number of tools that may reduce the difference between homevoter and leasevoter behav-
ior. Our results indicate that rental regulations that protect incumbent residents from rent 
increases make renters behave more like homeowners. Similarly, levies charged after a 
house is sold to compensate owners for capitalization effects due to public policies that 
affect housing values could make homeowners behave more like renters. Finally, mini-
mum participation (or favorable vote) quorums can significantly limit the ability of well-
organized interest groups (e.g., NIMBYists) to shape the voting outcome at the margin. 
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1 Introduction 
This technical appendix complements the main paper by providing additional details on 
data and methods and complementary evidence. Section 2 outlines the political and insti-
tutional background of the referendum on the new Berlin airport concept in detail. Section 
3 gives additional detail on our estimation strategy. First, we present the locally weighted 
regression approach used to isolate the non-linear amenity–tenure interaction effect. Sec-
ond, we present our strategy for computing a counterfactual election outcome. Third, we 
present a more detailed description of the semi-parametric estimation procedure used to 
identify the conditional nonlinear price signal–homeownership rate surface function. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data in detail, including how the proxies for the homeownership rate 
and the price signal were constructed. Section 5 complements the evidence provided in 
the main document with the counterfactual analysis and robustness checks. This appendix 
is not designed to replace but rather to complement the main paper. To improve readabil-
ity, it replicates some paragraphs of the main paper. 
2 The 2008 referendum on the new Berlin airport concept  
Partly because of its history, Berlin possessed three relatively small airports in the early 
1990s. Tegel and Tempelhof are centrally located within the boundaries of the former 
West Berlin, whereas Schoenefeld lies close to the southeastern boundaries of Berlin and 
served East Berlin during the division period. It was argued that a major, state-of-the-art 
airport was necessary to improve Berlin’s international connectivity and competitiveness 
and to attract new businesses. In addition, the two city airports in the former West Berlin 
exposed a densely populated area to noise, pollution, and crash risks. On July 4, 1996, the 
so-called “consensus decision” (Konsensbeschluss) was established among the mayor of 
Berlin, Eberhard Diepgen; Brandenburg’s state governor, Manfred Stolpe; and the 
transport minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Matthias Wissmann. These indi-
viduals decided to redevelop Schoenefeld into a large-scale, international hub airport 
named Berlin–Brandenburg International, where all air traffic would be concentrated, and 
to close Tegel and Tempelhof.  
Both city airports provided much better accessibility for many residents and businesses 
than did the more remote Schoenefeld. As a result, businesses and passenger lobbies chal-
lenged the decision, taking legal action and employing other tactics. After years of legal 
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and public disputes, the Berlin Senate released a “funded notification” (fundierter Bes-
cheid) requiring the closure of Tempelhof in August 2006. That decision was also chal-
lenged, but eventually, after another revision, the decision was upheld by the Federal Ad-
ministrative Court of Germany (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), which is the court of last re-
sort.  
The Tempelhof closure was scheduled for October 31, 2008. As this date approached, the 
intensity of the protests against the plan steadily increased. Opposition to the closure of 
Tempelhof was more strenuous than opposition to the closure of Tegel because the former 
change was imminent, whereas Tegel would remain in operation until the opening of Ber-
lin–Brandenburg International. In addition, Tempelhof was the object of strong emotional 
attachment as a result of its history. Tempelhof was Berlin’s most important access point 
during the 1948–49 airlift and brought supplies to the residents of West Berlin during the 
Berlin Blockade.  
It is important to note that the closure of Tempelhof, in addition to reducing noise and 
affecting access to flight connections, promised to have another important local effect. 
Although the future use of the airfield has not been decided, the authorities have long em-
phasized the potential of the site for public use. The airfield was opened to the public in 
October 2010, which made it one of the city’s largest public parks (Tempelhofer Feld) and 
a widely appreciated amenity. Simultaneously, rigid heritage legislation ensures the 
preservation of the former terminal buildings, which were constructed prior to WWII. In 
light of the relatively limited number of flights offered by the airport, the (expected) bene-
fits of gaining access to this public park could be expected to more than compensate the 
local residents for any reduction in airport accessibility. Nonetheless, the Interest Group 
for City Airport Tempelhof eventually forced a referendum in favor of Tempelhof’s re-
maining in operation. Although the results of the referendum were nonbinding for the 
Berlin city government, it was widely agreed that the referendum, if it had succeeded, 
would have exerted strong pressure on the city government, which thus would have been 
forced to rethink its decision (Nitsch, 2009).  
The vote was held on April 27, 2008. The referendum was approved by the majority of 
those who voted, but it failed to achieve the minimum favorable vote quorum of 25% of 
the total electorate. More detailed information on the history of Berlin’s airports and the 
Tempelhof referendum is provided by Nitsch (2009). 
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3 Empirical strategy 
3.1 Amenity tenure–interaction: Locally weighted regressions 
In this section, we explain the estimation procedure for the nonparametric locally 
weighted regression estimates displayed in Fig. 4 of the main paper. Locally weighted re-
gressions belong to the class of nonparametric approaches and essentially imply that for 
each observation (here precincts), a weighted regression is estimated based on a kernel 
(Cleveland & Devlin, 1988; McMillen, 1996; McMillen & Redfearn, 2010). Equation (11) 
from the main paper can then be rewritten with precinct-specific coefficients. We merge 
the individual airport effects estimated from the NLS estimates reported in the main paper 
(Table, 1, III) into one treatment variable in this procedure ( ̂  ∑ ( ̂      ̂    ) ). 
        ∑       
 
         ̂    (    ̂ )    ̃ 
In each local regression for  ̃, we assign a kernel weight    ̃ to observation j, which de-
pends on a bandwidth B and the difference between the homeownership rate at  ̃ and j. 
   ̃  
 
 √  
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     ̃
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Each series of locally weighted regressions produces a full set of precinct-specific parame-
ters   . The resulting nonlinear function depends on the bandwidth B, where larger values 
generate greater smoothing. Fig. 4 in the main paper plots the resulting functions with 
relatively small (10) and large (30) bandwidths. 
3.2 Amenity–tenure interaction: 
Counterfactual analysis of NIMBY effects  
For the sake of brevity, we refer to local patterns in the voting pattern as NIMBYism 
(where NIMBY stands for “not in my back yard”). NIMBYism can be motivated by the de-
sire to shift away or keep away negative environmental factors (e.g., noise). To determine 
how relevant NIMBYism was in the referendum in absolute terms and how likely it is to 
change electoral outcomes in similar scenarios, we construct a counterfactual that indi-
cates what the election outcome might have been in the absence of NIMBYism. Following 
the example of Ahlfeldt (2011), we model the share of “yes” and “no” votes within the total 
electorate as reflections of both the attitudes towards the referendum and the incentives 
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to participate in it generated by aircraft noise and airport accessibility, which together 
indicate the net distribution of the airport closure effects on the total population: 
    ∑      
 
 ∑ (           )
 
 ∑ [(           )    ]
 
    
where PE is the fraction of either “yes” or “no” votes divided by the number of eligible vot-
ers (the electorate) and where the other variables are defined as before. We separate the 
homeowner effect from a baseline effect that captures the expected change in the amenity 
distribution (aircraft noise and airport accessibility) and incentives to renters. We make 
this distinction using a full set of interaction terms with the local homeownership rate Hj, 
where the assumption is that the extra incentives to the homeowners that are reflected in 
the coefficients of the interaction terms stem from the anticipated capital gains/losses.  
With this specification, it is possible to compute the local contribution to the total number 
of “yes” or “no” votes by airport, which is important because the “push” and “pull” factors 
may work in opposite directions for Tempelhof and Tegel on the one hand and for Schoen-
efeld on the other.  
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where TEF is the baseline effect attributed to each of the three airports 
  {                               }, TEFH is the respective homeowner effect, DMF 
is the maximum distance of airport F from precinct j in the area, and EL is the precinct-
level total electorate (the population over the age of 18). The relevance of NIMBYism can 
then be evaluated quantitatively by comparing the overall contributions of the “yes” and 
“no” votes to the effective outcome and to the counterfactual scenario adjusted for local-
ized phenomena.  
3.3 Capitalization–tenure interaction:  
Nonlinear signal homeownership surface 
This section explains the generation of the semiparametric homeownership rate–price 
signal surface displayed in Fig. 5 of the main paper in greater detail. The aim of our empir-
ical strategy is to estimate the price signal–homeownership rate surface function f(S, H) 
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without imposing parametric constraints and conditional on amenity (∑ (       
     )) and socio-demographic (∑       ) factors. 
       ∑      
 
 ∑ (           )
 
  (     )     
Because the functional form of the interaction effect of the price signal and the homeown-
ership rate is not known a priori, we used a semi-parametric estimation strategy that can 
accommodate complex nonlinear effects along both dimensions and the interaction of the 
two surface variables.  
We create a discrete grid of cells to which voting precincts are allocated based on the local 
price signal and homeownership rate. The boundaries of these cells are determined by 
"bins" for price signal and homeownership rate values that are defined as follows: 
1)  Eleven bins BHh along the homeownership rate dimension for precincts with 
rates of Hj =0, 0<Hj≤10%, 10%<Hj≤20%, and so forth in increments of 10%. 
2)  Seven bins BSs along the price signal dimension for precincts with Sj ≤ -15%,  
 -15% >Sj ≤ -10%,…, -5% >Sj ≤ 0%, 0% < Sj ≤ 5%, 10% < Sj ≤ 15%,…., Sj > 15%. 
As in a spatial X/Y-coordinate system, each combination of indicator variables/bins along 
the two dimensions H and S forms a specific grid cell (       ). These grid cells can be 
used to replace the parametric formulation of the homeownership rate–price signal inter-
action effect in equation (12) (         (     )). 
       ∑      
 
    ∑ ∑    (       )
  
    
We estimate this specification with fixed effects for each grid cell (       ). This speci-
fication is similar to the use of location-specific fixed effects in house price capitalization 
research to capture otherwise unobservable location features (distributed along the X/Y 
dimensions).  
4 Data  
In this section, we provide a more detailed description of how the data set was compiled, 
especially with regard to the homeownership rates and the announcement effects on 
property prices, which are not readily observable. The next section introduces the main 
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components of our data, which were obtained from official sources. Section 3.2 explains 
how we define our local homeownership proxy and provides relevant background regard-
ing the particularities of Berlin’s housing markets and an empirical assessment of the 
method to replicate actual homeownership rates on a larger geographic scale. Section 3.3 
complements the data section of the main paper by presenting the baseline results ob-
tained using the estimated hedonic property price model.  
4.1 Noise, voting and socio-demographic data 
Noise data 
Among the most important baseline variables for the purpose of this analysis are those 
that capture exposure to aircraft noise within the neighborhoods affected by the three 
Berlin airports. From an official report (Laermkartierung nach Umgebungsrichtline, 
09.07.2007), we obtain detailed information on the exposure to aircraft noise from Tegel 
at the level of 10 × 10-m grid cells. The noise map for Tegel and its air corridors covers 
large parts of the northern half of the city. The noise levels are recorded for all of the de-
veloped properties within this area and expressed using a long-term sound pressure index 
(Lden) that is equivalent to the standard log-decibel scale (db). Using a geographic infor-
mation system (GIS), the information on aircraft noise is aggregated at the precinct level 
using the representative means for the noise observations in each voting precinct.  
For Tempelhof, the data were obtained from the Berlin Airports’ operating company (Flug-
hafengesellschaft) in the form of an electronic map on which iso-sound pressure zones of 
50–55, 55–60, 60–65, 65–67 and greater than 67 dB(A) are identified. Ahlfeldt and 
Maennig (2011) employed a regression-based interpolation to obtain a continuous sound 
surface within a 100 × 100-m grid for areas that experience sound pressure above 45 db. 
Here, our process was similar to the one that we used with the Tegel noise data: we 
merged Ahlfeldt and Maennig’s estimates with an electronic map of polling districts in a 
GIS environment. Using standard geographic interpolation techniques (Goodchild & Lam, 
1980), we generated precinct-level noise averages weighted by the shares of the precincts’ 
surface areas that fall into selected noise zones. 
No detailed noise maps were available for Schoenefeld, which lies outside the boundaries 
of Berlin and whose air corridor only crosses Berlin’s territory to a small extent. The only 
available information was a map of the restricted development area that incorporated the 
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assumption that noise levels would increase considerably when the new international 
airport, Berlin–Brandenburg International, was opened. We employed this information in 
our empirical analyses by defining indicator variables that have a value of one for property 
transactions and precincts that have centroids within the noise zone and that have a value 
of zero otherwise. 
Fig. 1 in the main paper illustrates the noise surfaces for values greater than 45 db. As dis-
cussed in the main paper, only aircraft noise exceeding this threshold is considered in the 
empirical analyses. Lower levels of aircraft noise are likely to be dominated by other noise 
sources and are not likely to influence property prices (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2011). We 
define all of the noise variables for Tegel and Tempelhof such that they express the num-
ber of db above the 45-db threshold, e.g., values of 5, 10, and 15 correspond to 50, 55, and 
60 db, respectively. Values below 45 db were set to zero to reflect levels of aircraft noise 
that were indistinguishable from other types of noise. 
Voting data 
The data on the voting results for the Tempelhof referendum were obtained from the state 
statistical office in Berlin–Brandenburg. Of the 881,035 votes that were cast, 650,464 
votes could be used in the empirical analyses. These results are available as aggregated 
outcomes at the level of 1,201 voting precincts and were merged with an electronic map of 
the precinct boundaries via a unique identifier variable. The remaining mail-in votes could 
not be considered because of missing geo-references.1 We used a GIS framework to merge 
the voting outcome with 2008 data on socio-demographic characteristics that were avail-
able for 15,937 statistical blocks (data regarding population, age groups, the proportion of 
males, and the population of non-German citizens), 191 zip codes (data regarding purchas-
ing power), 338 traffic cells (data regarding unemployment rates), and 2,424 small voting 
precincts (data regarding voting in the 2006 state elections). These data were obtained 
from the statistical office in Berlin, with the exception of the data on purchasing power, 
which were originally derived from a report by the Consumer Research Society (Gesell-
schaft für Konsumforschung). Again, standard area interpolation techniques (Arntz & 
                                                             
1 Nitsch (2009) has shown that the differences by district are negligible when the votes cast at ballot boxes 
and by mail are compared. 
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Wilke, 2007; Goodchild & Lam, 1980) were used to aggregate all of the data to the level of 
the 1,201 precincts in a GIS environment. 
Socio-economic and demographic controls 
Based on these data sources, we compile our baseline data set to control for the socioeco-
nomic and demographic characteristics of the local population. To account for the possibil-
ity that the residents of the former East Berlin feel less attached to a West Berlin airport, 
we include an indicator variable in the vector of location variables that is set to one for the 
precincts within the boundaries of the former East Berlin. The proportion of votes by the 
major conservative opposition parties in the 2006 federal elections is included to take into 
account the loyalties, strategic effects, attachments, and lifestyle preferences of the sup-
porters of the Christian Democratic Party and those of the Liberals, who strongly support-
ed the referendum. The proportion of Green party voters (Die Grünen) is included to take 
into account this group’s particular sensitivity to environmental issues. The proportions of 
various age groups are included because households in different life stages may perceive 
different (dis)utilities as associated with airports. Purchasing power per capita is included 
to reflect environmental preferences that are correlated with income. Given that only EU 
citizens were entitled to vote in the referendum, the proportion of the non-German popu-
lation serves mainly as a neighborhood variable that helps us to account for the unob-
served characteristics that are correlated with the proportion of the population that is 
foreign born.  
These variables are included to control for any heterogeneous preferences regarding the 
new airport concept that are correlated with these attributes. Heterogeneous preference 
can lead to the sorting of residents with specific preferences into certain neighborhoods. 
Because of the costs of relocation, these residents may engage in NIMBYism to attempt to 
prevent changes to their neighborhoods. It is difficult to illustrate the presence of such 
sorting because preferences regarding aircraft noise and airport accessibility cannot be 
observed directly. To the degree that these unobservable preferences are correlated with 
observable socio-economic characteristics, their spatial distribution yields some insight 
into the presence of sorting. Fig. A1 compares the spatial distribution of aircraft noise to 
selected socio-demographic characteristics at the precinct level. The scatter plots show the 
weak but notable correlations between the presence of aircraft noise and the local unem-
ployment rate and the proportions of selected age groups in the local population. 
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Fig. A1. Residential sorting 
  
  
Notes: Noise is measured by the sound pressure (db) exceeding 45 db(A). 
4.2 Approximation of the homeownership rate 
Although our data set is unusually rich with respect to hedonic property characteristics, 
including location features, proxies for noise, and precinct attributes, confidentiality rules 
prevent us from determining homeownership rates directly at a highly disaggregated spa-
tial level. Because we require a proxy variable that can help us to approximate these rates 
at the precinct level, we make use of a particularity of the Berlin housing market: its seg-
mentation into detached, semidetached, and attached single-family houses, villas, and 
townhouses, which are almost entirely occupied by owners, and typical downtown apart-
ment buildings, which are usually five stories tall and almost entirely occupied by renters.  
It is well documented that accommodation type is an important determinant of tenure 
choice across European countries (Hilber, 2007), but this segregation is particularly strik-
ing in Germany and in Berlin in particular. The low number of three-or-more-family hous-
es inhabited by owners in Berlin results from the heavily subsidized supply of apartments 
for rent and the restrictive policy on rent levels and rent increases that existed in West 
Berlin until 1980, both of which led to rent levels in Berlin that were significantly below 
those of comparable German cities. This unique attribute of Berlin persists to the present 
42
AHLFELDT / MAENNIG – Homevoters vs. leasevoters  
day. Until the end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), it was almost impossible to 
privately own an apartment in East Berlin, but it was possible to own a single-family 
house. In addition, unemployment rates in Berlin were high (13.84% in 20082) compared 
to national levels, and incomes were low. Finally, the percentage of single-person house-
holds was approximately 53.3% and increasing (46.0% in 1998, 50.1% in 2003), whereas 
the number of three-or-more-person households (which are traditionally those that pur-
chase real estate) is shrinking (Amt für Statistik Berlin–Brandenburg, 2008). This market 
segregation becomes apparent in the German microcensus data. Because no full popula-
tion census was conducted after 1987, the microcensus (which provides data for a 1% 
population sample) currently represents the most detailed household database main-
tained by the German Federal Statistical Office. Table 1 displays a subsample of the 2002 
microcensus that has been anonymized and made publicly available by the statistical of-
fice.3 In this representative sample, more than 90% of one- and two-family houses are 
occupied by owners, and more than 90% of the inhabitants of dwellings in three-or-more 
family houses are occupied by tenants. 
Tab. A1. Tenure status by dwelling type in Germany and Berlin 
Tenure status by dwelling type in Germany 
 Dwelling units ≤ 2 Dwelling units > 2 Total 
 Total  % Total %  
Owner 10,372 78.68% 1,943 16.60% 12,315 
Tenant 2,632 19.97% 9,542 81.53% 12,174 
Subtenant 178 1.35% 218 1.86% 396 
Total 13,182   11,703   24,885 
Tenure status by dwelling type in Berlin 
 Dwelling units ≤ 2 Dwelling units > 2 Total 
 Total  % Total %  
Owner 134 90.54% 54 6.42% 188 
Tenant 14 9.46% 777 92.39% 791 
Subtenant 0 0.00% 10 1.19% 10 
Total 148   841   989 
                                                             
2 Available at website http://www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de, last accessed on 18 July 2012. 
3 The data set can be accessed at 
http://www.forschungsdatenzentrum.de/bestand/mikrozensus/cf/2002/index.asp 
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The Urban Environmental Information System of the Senate Department characterizes 
15,937 statistical blocks using a range of homogeneity criteria, including building struc-
ture. Based on the assumptions presented above, the homeownership rate (HR) for a vot-
ing precinct j can be approximated as the proportion of the total population above the age 
of 18 (the electorate or EL) within the voting precinct that lives within the boundaries of a 
statistical block k that features single-family homes (SF): 
   
∑           
∑      
 
Our homeownership proxy based on the city district figures performs reasonably well, as 
revealed by its approximately linear relationship with the observable share of owner-
occupied dwellings within the total dwelling stock (Fig. A2). A regression of the observed 
proportion of owner-occupied dwellings with our estimated homeownership rate at the 
district level yields an R2 slightly greater than 0.75. Our estimated homeownership rates 
are slightly larger than the proportion of owner-occupied dwellings, most likely because 
we analyze the members of the local population who are 18 years old or older and because 
a relatively larger number of people live in one- or two-family houses. This consideration 
is important for the purpose of our analysis because this is the population of potential 
voters in which we are interested.  
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Fig. A2. Estimated vs. current homeownership rate (at Bezirke level) 
 
Notes: The percentage of owner-occupied dwellings in the total dwelling stock was taken from 
the 2008 IBB Property Market Report (Immobilienmarktbericht) and reflects the situa-
tion on December 31, 2007. 
4.3  Price signals and announcement effects 
One requirement of our empirical strategy is a proxy variable for the expected effect of the 
initiative in question on local prices. Throughout our analyses, we assume that current 
prices reflect discounted future rent streams and that, in the absence of regulation, prices 
and rents move in tandem.  
As discussed in Section 4.3 of the main paper, we estimate a price signal using the proper-
ty market responses to the 1996 announcement of the new Berlin airport concept. Our 
estimation strategy builds on a long tradition within the hedonic property literature of 
assuming that all of the associated costs and benefits of specific property attributes fully 
capitalize into prices (Rosen, 1974). We attribute changes in (log) prices     (  ) to the 
location of a property relative to the three airports 
(    {                           }), which we express in terms of XF and YF coordi-
nates (and the interactions of both) in the auxiliary airport coordinate systems using a 
flexible cubic functional form.  
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These locational price adjustments can be estimated conditional individual property and 
location characteristics based on the following hedonic equation: 
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where Pit is the price per land area of property i sold on day t and So and Ll are broad sets 
of structural and locational characteristics. POST is an indicator variable that denotes the 
time after the announcement and SBj is a full set of voting precinct-fixed effects to control 
for unobserved time-invariant spatial heterogeneity. We also cluster the standard errors 
at the same level to facilitate shifts in the mean and variance of the error across space.  
Column I in Table A2 presents the results. The estimated "implicit" prices of the property 
attributes considered are in line with our expectations. The location control variables are 
less informative because they are estimated conditional on a fine grid of voter precinct 
effects and are only included to account for the residual within-precinct variation. We 
therefore omit these results. Columns II and III report the results of the estimates con-
ducted using separate subsamples of single-family and multi-family homes. As discussed 
in the data section, these market segments are dominated by owners and renters, respec-
tively. We use the resulting price signals as robustness checks, as described in the next 
section. In each model (I–III), the variables used to capture the price signal pass a Wald 
test of joint significance.  
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Tab. A2. Prices signal estimation: Hedonic estimates 
 (I)  
 Coeff. S.E. 
Single family house 0.035 (0.036) 
Floor Space Index (FSI) 0.824
***
 (0.050) 
FSI squared -0.075
***
 (0.009) 
Plot Area (m²) -0.000
**
 (0.000) 
Plot Area squared 0.000 (0.000) 
Story -0.012 (0.010) 
Age (Years) -0.014
***
 (0.001) 
Age (Years) squared 0.000
***
 (0.000) 
Condition: Good 0.306
***
 (0.031) 
Condition: Bad -0.181
***
 (0.024) 
Extra flat in attic 0.092
***
 (0.019) 
Elevator 0.417
***
 (0.087) 
Basement 0.057
***
 (0.022) 
Underground car park 0.000 (.) 
Charge for infrastructure -0.017 (0.027) 
Not occupied by renter 0.136
***
 (0.029) 
Share at sec. structure -3.482
**
 (1.355) 
Urban renewal area -0.002 (0.016) 
Treat x POST Wald test (p-value) 0.030 
 Location Controls YES 
 Precinct Effects YES 
 Daily Trend (3
rd
-order polynomial) YES 
 TREAT YES 
 TREAT x POST YES 
Period 1 YEAR +/- ANN.  
Observations 6796 
R
2
 0.794 
AIC 5768.0 
Notes:  In all of the models, the dependent variable is the log of price per square meter of land. 
Location controls include Dist. to Center (km), Dist. to Water (km), Dist. to Green (km), 
Dist. to Station (km), Dist. to Main St. (km), Street Noise (db), Dist. to Industry (km), 
Landmarks within 600 m, Dist. to Landmark (km), and Dist. to School (km). TREAT in-
cludes the (cubic) X and Y coordinates and interaction terms of the auxiliary coordinate 
systems. The standard errors are clustered on voting precincts. **/*/+ denote signifi-
cance at the 1/5/10% levels.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The spatial pattern of the estimated announcement effects is shown in Fig. 2 in the main 
text. These effects show a relatively large degree of variation in property price adjust-
ments, ranging from less than −15% to more than 15%. Although these extreme values 
may seem relatively large for announcement effects, our estimates are conclusive, given a 
number of particularities.  
Both the positive and the negative extreme values relate to voting precincts in the far 
southeast region of the city that fall within the air corridor of the new international air-
port. The precincts that are adjacent to the airfield were already exposed to high levels of 
aircraft noise but experienced a strong increase in value because they are now nearly 
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within walking distance of the new airport. The resulting opportunities for new uses of 
real estate (e.g., as accommodations for shift workers and crew members) may explain the 
pronounced reaction of the property prices within an area that was formerly barely attrac-
tive. Similarly, the new airport concept has generated a nonmarginal shift in aircraft noise 
in an area that was previously very attractive due to its favorable natural environment, 
which includes lakes and forests (see Fig. A3). Given the average noise effect of -0.6% per 
db aircraft noise in the literature (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2011; Nelson, 2004), a 30% reduc-
tion in property prices (which we find for some precincts in the Schoenefeld area) would 
correspond to an anticipated increase in airport noise of approximately 50 db. Although 
reliable estimates of future (and current) sound pressure levels are not available, an in-
crease of this magnitude seems somewhat unlikely. However, given the particular natural 
environment, which includes nature preserves, it seems realistic that the current inhabit-
ants have an above-average valuation of the environmental quality of their surroundings, 
which could explain the disproportionate drop in value.  
For the other two airports, the increase in prices is more consistent with conventional 
noise estimates. The announcement effects have values of up to approximately 23% in the 
Tempelhof noise zone and 13% in the Tegel noise zone. Taking the abovementioned aver-
age noise effect as a benchmark, we find that these results imply reductions in noise pres-
sure of approximately 38 db (Tempelhof) and 22 db (Tegel). This decrease for Tempelhof 
is greater than the difference between current noise levels (see Fig. 1 in the main text) and 
the 45-db threshold, below which no effects are to be expected (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 
2011). It is important to note, however, that the increase in prices may reflect not only an 
anticipated reduction in noise but also expected utility from enhanced access to the air-
field as a recreational space.  
Moreover, some care is required in applying cross-sectional noise estimates to non-
marginal changes in the distribution of aircraft noise, due to potential sorting effects. As 
discussed above, it is difficult to investigate sorting with respect to aircraft noise because 
preferences regarding noise are not directly observable. Fig. A1 suggests that some sorting 
may have taken place. Assuming a nonmarginal reduction in aircraft noise, the neighbor-
hood will become attractive to other populations. This prediction is especially important 
given the location of the airport. Almost the entire air corridor of Tempelhof falls within 
central and highly accessible areas that include typical historic architecture and urban 
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design that dates back to the nineteenth-century Hobrecht Plan (Strohmeyer, 2000), as is 
typical of areas that have experienced gentrification (Ahlfeldt, 2011). Berlin, a symbol of a 
particularly urban lifestyle, attracts some 120,000 to 150,000 immigrants annually. With 
the dissipation of significant environmental disutilities, the areas in question become at-
tractive to potential gentrifiers. Hence, the observed property price appreciation effect 
includes both a reduction in the disamenity level and an anticipated increase in the envi-
ronmental quality of the area among new marginal buyers or renters. Together, these ef-
fects can explain the significant appreciation of residential property prices in the 
Tempelhof area relative to the expected effects of aircraft noise as derived from the cross-
sectional analyses. For Tegel, where the future use of the airfield remains uncertain, the 
price signal and the implied noise effects are broadly in line with the actual distribution of 
aircraft noise. 
Fig. A3. Schoenefeld noise impacted area 
 
Notes: Authors’ illustration based on data from the urban and environmental information sys-
tem of the Berlin Senate Department (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 
2006) 
Although the magnitude of the effect seems plausible given the aforementioned sorting 
effects, the nature of the announcement must be considered to understand why nearly full 
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capitalization should be expected more than 10 years prior to the opening of the new air-
port. At the time the decision was made, the topic had been discussed intensively by the 
government, the public and the media. Schoenefeld was only one of more than 10 initially 
proposed options and was only seventh in the initial rankings. Even in the last stage of the 
selection process, there were three serious options remaining: Schoenefeld and sites in 
Sperenberg and Jueterbog-Ost, which were previously used for military purposes. Both of 
the latter alternatives offered significant advantages in terms of 24-hour airport opera-
tions because of their location in sparsely populated areas. However, the eventual decision 
was the result of a complex bargaining process among state and federal administrative 
and political bodies that considered several environmental and economic factors: accessi-
bility, the exposure of the population to noise, biodiversity, and the cost of new infrastruc-
ture. Thus, the decision was difficult to foresee. Once the decision was made, however, it 
was largely taken as given.  
At that time (1996), the planning authorities had an acceptable record of completing the 
development and infrastructure projects needed to restructure a city that had been divid-
ed for almost 50 years. The reintegration and necessary upgrading of severed urban rail 
lines, telecommunication networks, and electricity, gas, and sewage systems were com-
pleted fairly quickly. The new government district and commercial developments along 
Friedrichstrasse and Potsdamer Platz had already begun to massively reshape the appear-
ance of the central city by 1996. Moreover, construction was initiated on a new mainline 
rail connection that crossed the city from north to south and a new central rail station at 
the intersection of the new rail line with the old east–west line. New road and rail tunnels 
crossing the government district and the River Spree were also constructed.  
In this environment, the strengthened planning authorities had sufficient credibility to 
instill confidence that the new airport would be completed once the plan was announced. 
In this context, we would expect the largest price reaction to the new airport concept to 
occur concurrent with the announcement of the final plans. To evaluate the validity of this 
assumption, we run a series of placebo treatment regressions in which we used the prop-
erty price changes (     (  )) implied by the benchmark regression (see above in this sec-
tion) as the treatment (Ti). 
   ∑ ∑ [   ̂|   |
     ̂|   |
     ̂|       |
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The treatment is used in reduced-form placebo regressions q where we consider January 1 
and July 1 of the years from 1991 to 2009 as the intervention dates. As in the benchmark 
announcement regressions, we focus on one-year windows before and after the placebo 
intervention.  
   (   )    
                           
 ∑       
 
 ∑       
 
 ∑       
 
      
By construction, the treatment coefficient   
     indicates the placebo treatment effect 
relative to the date when we expect the adjustments (June 2, 1996). The results are illus-
trated in Fig. A4, which plots the size of the placebo effects relative to the price effects in 
June 1996. The figure has at least three striking features. First, none of the placebo effects 
are close to the price effects in terms of magnitude. Second, the effects are only significant-
ly different from zero for two additional dates. Third, the degree of volatility is significant-
ly larger before the announcement than after the announcement. These findings indicate 
that the announcement was the relevant event, removing a great degree of uncertainty 
from the market and inducing capitalization effects.  
Fig. A4. Placebo treatment effects 
 
Notes: This figure presents the estimates for the placebo regressions relative to the announce-
ment effects on prices associated with the July 4, 1996 announcement benchmark.  
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5 Results 
5.1 Amenity–interaction effects: results of counterfactual analy-
sis of NIMBY effects 
The results presented in section 5.2 of the main paper indicate the presence of (expected) 
utility effects that depend on anticipated changes in aircraft noise and airport accessibility 
and on their interaction with the tenure status of the local population. Because these ef-
fects are local, they may generate local political activism, as postulated by the homevoter 
hypothesis.  
To assess the quantitative relevance of NIMBYism that may emerge from the anticipated 
local costs and benefits anticipated by voters, we separately estimate models for the turn-
out and the proportions of “no” and “yes” votes in the total electorate. This approach ac-
counts for the possibility that amenity and tenure interaction effects not only affect the 
voting decisions of those participating in the referendum but also influence whether a par-
ticular individual votes.  
Tab. A3. Airport (dis)amenities and turnout 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Turnout (x100) “No” votes in the 
total electorate 
(x100) 
(support new con-
cept) 
“Yes” votes in the 
total electorate 
(x100) 
(oppose new con-
cept) 
Tempelhof noise (db) 0.491*** (0.084) 0.507*** (0.073) -0.017 (0.086) 
Tegel noise (db) 0.004 (0.028) 0.085*** (0.017) -0.081*** (0.022) 
Schoenefeld noise zone (dummy) -5.939** (2.531) -1.708 (3.570) -4.196 (3.189) 
Distance to Tempelhof (km) -0.119 (0.085) -0.081 (0.052) -0.040 (0.064) 
Distance to Tegel (km) -0.216*** (0.078) -0.203*** (0.049) -0.011 (0.059) 
Distance to Schoenefeld (km) -0.332*** (0.069) -0.202*** (0.044) -0.128*** (0.048) 
Tempelhof noise (db) x H 0.026* (0.015) 0.007 (0.009) 0.020* (0.011) 
Tegel noise (db) x H -0.001 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) 
Schoenefeld noise zone x H 0.134*** (0.043) -0.056 (0.044) 0.189*** (0.059) 
Dist. to Tempelhof (km) x H 0.013*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.015*** (0.002) 
Dist. to Tegel (km) x H -0.005*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.002) 
Dist. to Schoenefeld (km) x H -0.004** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) 
Controls YES  YES  YES  
Observations 1201  1201  1201  
R2 0.792  0.725  0.897  
AIC 6498.1  5451.3  6015.0  
Notes: Controls include all covariates used in Table 1, column (1), plus homeownership rate. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The results presented in Table A3 are generally consistent with our expectations and the 
previous results but are somewhat difficult to interpret because noise, access, and home-
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owner effects, as well as the effects on “yes” and “no” votes, must be considered in tandem 
for us to understand the resulting local effects.  
The airport effects become easier to capture when the contribution to total votes (in thou-
sands of votes) is aggregated by airport (see section 2.2 in this appendix for the method). 
Table A4 separates the localized effects into a baseline (environmental and renter NIMBY) 
effect and a homeowner (NIMBY) effect by airport. There are no a priori expectations re-
garding the net effect of countervailing externalities related to noise and accessibility. Ad-
ditionally, for the homevoter effect, the direction of the net effect is an empirical question 
because the neighborhoods surrounding the airports may be differently affected by noise. 
As a result, airports may have either positive or negative net effects on utility, prices, or 
both. 
For Tempelhof, the local baseline effect is clearly negative (33,000 vs. 15,000), which im-
plies that a clear local majority of the residents are in favor of relocating the airport activi-
ty to the new site. The relatively large number of local voters (15,000 individuals) who 
wish to keep the airport in operation could be potential users of the airport or—in light of 
the limited airport activity prior to its closure—renter NIMBYs who wish to avoid antici-
pated real estate appreciation (gentrification). The local homeowner NIMBY effect also 
works in this direction and increases the local support for the new airport by approxi-
mately 6,000 votes.  
The baseline effect is even more striking in the case of the more frequented Tegel; the net 
homeowner effect is that 109,000 voters perceive the airport as a local net disamenity, 
whereas only 2,000 perceive it as an amenity. The homeowner effect moves in the oppo-
site direction but remains small relative to the baseline effect. For Schoenefeld, the pattern 
is reversed. The baseline local effect works in favor of the new airport, though the popula-
tion is somewhat split (80 vs. 51). The homeowner effect, however, increases local opposi-
tion by approximately 5,000 votes and reduces local support by 1,000, indicating that the 
(negative) noise effect dominates homeowner voting (NIMBY) behavior. However, it is 
notable that the homeowner effect is again small compared to the baseline effect.  
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Tab. A4. NIMBYism by airport 
  Baseline contribution Homeowner contribution 
  Tempelhof Tegel Schoenefeld Total Tempelhof Tegel Schoenefeld Total 
Yes (oppos-
ing new 
concept) 
15 2 51 68 -5 3 5 3 
No (sup-
porting 
new con-
cept) 
33 109 80 222 1 -2 -1 -2 
No – Yes  
(net sup-
port) 
18 107 30 154 6 -5 -6 5 
Notes:  The absolute numbers are in thousands of votes.  
Based on these estimated contributions to the absolute number of “yes” and “no” votes, we 
can compute counterfactual scenarios for the election outcome in the absence of 
NIMBYism by subtracting the baseline and homevoter contributions from the actual out-
come of the poll. Table A5 compares the actual voting results to three counterfactual sce-
narios in which we exclude the effects of (dis)amenity and renter NIMBYism (Column I), 
homeowner NIMBYism (Column II) and both (Column III).  
Counterfactual I shows that local effects played an important role in the election outcome, 
although these effects were not strong enough to alter the majority vote. Without 
NIMBYism based on local noise and accessibility effects, a larger share of voters would 
have preferred the continued operation of Tempelhof (and Tegel), at 14.3% to 2% (vs. 
17.3% to 12.1% in the official referendum results). Counterfactual II shows that the 
homevoter effect worked in the opposite direction but played a limited role overall be-
cause the already small contributions cancel each other out at the different airport loca-
tions. The limited role of the homevoter effect, however, may be specific to the public ac-
tivity in question and to the Berlin region, its local population densities, and its tenure 
composition. Even in the present setting, a somewhat tighter vote could have led non-
homeowner NIMBYs to influence the majority vote because the silent majority individually 
faced lower incentives to participate in the referendum. However, this potentially influen-
tial vote by a NIMBY minority is partially due to the generally low turnout. If the participa-
tion rate had been higher, the absolute contribution would have limited the opportunity 
for NIMBYism to play a decisive role. Although the 25% participation quorum ironically 
worked in favor of the NIMBYs at Tempelhof and Tegel, it would have prevented them 
from playing a decisive role in the scenario in which they were most likely to influence the 
outcome: under very low general turnout. 
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Tab. A5. Counterfactual analysis 
  
Official referen-
dum results 
Counterfactual  
(I) 
Net of baseline 
NIMBYism 
Counterfactual  
(II) 
Net of 
homevoter 
NIMBYism 
Counterfactual  
(III) 
Net of total  
NIMBYism 
  Votes % Votes % Votes % Votes % 
Yes  
(opposition 
to the new 
airport con-
cept) 
383 17.3 315 14.3 380 17.2 312 14.1 
No  
(support) 
267 12.1 44 2.0 269 12.2 47 2.1 
No – Yes 
(net support) 
-116 
 
-270 
 
-111 
 
-266 
 
Abstention 1558 70.6 1848 83.7 1559 70.6 1849 83.8 
Electorate 2207 100.0 2207 100.0 2207 100.0 2207 100.0 
Notes: The absolute numbers are in thousands of votes. Mail-in votes were excluded from the 
analysis. 
5.2 Capitalization–tenure interaction effects: robustness checks 
Table 1 (column) and Figure 5 in the main paper present the parametric results of our 
empirical test of the capitalization tenure interaction effect. Table A6 complements the 
evidence by adding several variations to the benchmark specification. Model I in column I 
begins with an evaluation of whether our results are driven by extreme values in the esti-
mated price signals. Our concern is that the highly flexible functional form of our treat-
ment variable TREAT used in the estimation of the price signal could lead to exaggerated 
estimates in areas with relatively few transactions. We therefore restrict the variation in 
the price signal to the 1st to 99th percentile interval, i.e., we assign the value at the 1st (99th) 
percentile to all observations below (above) the respective threshold. The results are qual-
itatively consistent and quantitatively close to the benchmark model. Models II and III 
alter the baseline model by estimating a quadratic and cubic version of the price signal–
homeownership surface. The 2nd- or 3rd-order polynomials of the homeownership rate H, 
the price signal S and the interactions HxS are jointly statistically distinguishable from 
zero according to a Wald test. The resulting surfaces are plotted in Fig. A5. The quadratic 
surface is highly consistent with the linear version in Fig. 5 in the main paper. The cubic 
version mainly differs from the benchmark results in that it indicates small but negative 
capitalization-related effects to renters and owners at locations with negative price sig-
nals. The positive homeownership-capitalization interaction effect, however, is clearly 
evident in both surfaces.  
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Fig. A5. Quadratic and cubic price signal homeownership surface 
 
Notes: Baseline models are II and III in Table A6. 
Models IV–VIII provide robustness checks for the basic linear model. In Model IV, we boot-
strap the standard errors in 500 replications to address potential issues that might be 
generated by the fact that the price signal (S) is a generated regressor (Murphy & Topel, 
2002). While the homeownership rate–price signal interaction term is no longer signifi-
cant, all surface variables easily pass a Wald joint significance test. Model V uses weighted 
regressions in which observations with larger numbers of eligible voters receive propor-
tionally higher weights, to prevent our results from being driven by marginal precincts. In 
Models VI and VII, we estimate a spatial error model and a lag model (Anselin, 1988) using 
a maximum likelihood estimator because the spatial Lagrange multiplier test suggests the 
presence of a significant degree of spatial dependency.4 We use a row-standardized expo-
nential distance weights matrix to give higher weights to voting precincts that are closer to 
                                                             
4 The test scores from the baseline specification presented in the main document (Table 3, Column V) are as 
follows: spatial error: Lagrange multiplier 18.86, robust Lagrange multiplier 13.46; spatial lag: Lagrange 
multiplier 25.29, robust Lagrange multiplier 19.89. 
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each other.5 Model VIII replicates the benchmark specification of Table 1 in the main paper 
but replaces the straight distance measures with road distance measures to incorporate 
the effect of the actual road system on accessibility. Column XI presents the results ob-
tained using our benchmark specification and a third-order polynomial distance specifica-
tion. Based on a comparison across the results, it is evident that the parametric results 
discussed in the main text exhibit a relatively large degree of stability with respect to 
technical changes to the specification.  
                                                             
5  The weight depends on the distance to voting precinct j on      
     ∑        ⁄  and the decay parame-
ter , to which we assigned a value of 0.1, making the half-life distance slightly less than 7 km. 
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Tab. A6. Capitalization–tenure interaction robustness checks 
 I 
OLS 
II 
OLS 
III 
WLS 
IV 
SAR (err) 
V 
SAR (lag) 
VI 
OLS 
VII 
OLS 
XIII 
OLS 
IX 
OLS 
 “No” votes as a percentage of total votes 
(Former) East Berlin (dummy) -0.995
***
 
(0.130) 
-0.944
***
 
(0.122) 
-0.877
***
 
(0.118) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.119) 
-0.925
***
 
(0.126) 
-0.777
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.439
***
 
(0.076) 
-0.688 
(0.473) 
Share conservative parties (×100) 0.313
**
 
(0.143) 
0.348
**
 
(0.145) 
0.536
***
 
(0.118) 
0.232 
(0.158) 
0.248
**
 
(0.111) 
0.217
*
 
(0.115) 
0.104 
(0.111) 
0.113
**
 
(0.046) 
-1.139
***
 
(0.412) 
Share Green party (×100) 0.423
***
 
(0.098) 
0.431
***
 
(0.105) 
0.531
***
 
(0.089) 
0.337
***
 
(0.112) 
0.345
***
 
(0.087) 
0.330
***
 
(0.091) 
0.279
***
 
(0.086) 
0.231
***
 
(0.044) 
1.454
***
 
(0.465) 
Share age < 18 (×100) -0.995
***
 
(0.130) 
-0.944
***
 
(0.122) 
-0.877
***
 
(0.118) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.119) 
-0.925
***
 
(0.126) 
-0.777
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.439
***
 
(0.076) 
-0.688 
(0.473) 
Share age 18–27 (×100) 0.313
**
 
(0.143) 
0.348
**
 
(0.145) 
0.536
***
 
(0.118) 
0.232 
(0.158) 
0.248
**
 
(0.111) 
0.217
*
 
(0.115) 
0.104 
(0.111) 
0.113
**
 
(0.046) 
-1.139
***
 
(0.412) 
Share age 45–55 (×100) 0.423
***
 
(0.098) 
0.431
***
 
(0.105) 
0.531
***
 
(0.089) 
0.337
***
 
(0.112) 
0.345
***
 
(0.087) 
0.330
***
 
(0.091) 
0.279
***
 
(0.086) 
0.231
***
 
(0.044) 
1.454
***
 
(0.465) 
Share age >55 (×100) -0.995
***
 
(0.130) 
-0.944
***
 
(0.122) 
-0.877
***
 
(0.118) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.119) 
-0.925
***
 
(0.126) 
-0.777
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.439
***
 
(0.076) 
-0.688 
(0.473) 
Purch. power 1000 Euro/capita 0.313
**
 
(0.143) 
0.348
**
 
(0.145) 
0.536
***
 
(0.118) 
0.232 
(0.158) 
0.248
**
 
(0.111) 
0.217
*
 
(0.115) 
0.104 
(0.111) 
0.113
**
 
(0.046) 
-1.139
***
 
(0.412) 
Share non-Germans (×100) 0.423
***
 
(0.098) 
0.431
***
 
(0.105) 
0.531
***
 
(0.089) 
0.337
***
 
(0.112) 
0.345
***
 
(0.087) 
0.330
***
 
(0.091) 
0.279
***
 
(0.086) 
0.231
***
 
(0.044) 
1.454
***
 
(0.465) 
Share unemployed (×100) -0.995
***
 
(0.130) 
-0.944
***
 
(0.122) 
-0.877
***
 
(0.118) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.119) 
-0.925
***
 
(0.126) 
-0.777
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.439
***
 
(0.076) 
-0.688 
(0.473) 
Tempelhof noise (db) 0.313
**
 
(0.143) 
0.348
**
 
(0.145) 
0.536
***
 
(0.118) 
0.232 
(0.158) 
0.248
**
 
(0.111) 
0.217
*
 
(0.115) 
0.104 
(0.111) 
0.113
**
 
(0.046) 
-1.139
***
 
(0.412) 
Tegel noise (db) 0.423
***
 
(0.098) 
0.431
***
 
(0.105) 
0.531
***
 
(0.089) 
0.337
***
 
(0.112) 
0.345
***
 
(0.087) 
0.330
***
 
(0.091) 
0.279
***
 
(0.086) 
0.231
***
 
(0.044) 
1.454
***
 
(0.465) 
Schoenefeld noise zone (dummy) -0.995
***
 
(0.130) 
-0.944
***
 
(0.122) 
-0.877
***
 
(0.118) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.119) 
-0.925
***
 
(0.126) 
-0.777
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.439
***
 
(0.076) 
-0.688 
(0.473) 
Distance to Tempelhof (km) 0.313
**
 
(0.143) 
0.348
**
 
(0.145) 
0.536
***
 
(0.118) 
0.232 
(0.158) 
0.248
**
 
(0.111) 
0.217
*
 
(0.115) 
0.104 
(0.111) 
0.113
**
 
(0.046) 
 
Distance to Tegel (km) 0.423
***
 
(0.098) 
0.431
***
 
(0.105) 
0.531
***
 
(0.089) 
0.337
***
 
(0.112) 
0.345
***
 
(0.087) 
0.330
***
 
(0.091) 
0.279
***
 
(0.086) 
0.231
***
 
(0.044) 
 
Distance to Schoenefeld (km) -0.995
***
 
(0.130) 
-0.944
***
 
(0.122) 
-0.877
***
 
(0.118) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.931
***
 
(0.119) 
-0.925
***
 
(0.126) 
-0.777
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.439
***
 
(0.076) 
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Tab. A6 (continued)          
 I II III IV V VI IX X XI 
Homeownership rate (HR) (×100) 0.072
***
 
(0.013) 
  0.066
***
 
(0.012) 
0.077
***
 
(0.010) 
0.063
***
 
(0.010) 
0.056
***
 
(0.010) 
0.058
***
 
(0.011) 
0.042
***
 
(0.010) 
Price signal from 1996 announcement 
(×100) 
-0.079 
(0.060) 
  -0.153
**
 
(0.073) 
-0.165
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.149
***
 
(0.026) 
-0.167
***
 
(0.026) 
-0.154
***
 
(0.048) 
-0.030 
(0.025) 
Signal × HR 0.004
**
 
(0.002) 
  0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
0.003
***
 
(0.000) 
0.003
***
 
(0.000) 
0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
0.001
**
 
(0.000) 
Lambda       0.890
*** 
(0.112) 
  
Rho        0.432
*** 
(0.086) 
 
Surface variables Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Distance measure  Straight line Straight 
line 
Straight 
line 
Straight 
line 
Straight line Road dis-
tance 
Straight 
line  
Straight line Straight-line 
Third-order 
polynomial. 
Observations 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201 
R
2
 0.920 0.917 0.928   0.913 0.737 0.888 0.932 
AIC 7675.3 7709.1 7562.0 7702.0 7691.0 7759.4 5394.5 6103.1 7484.1 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are bootstrapped within 500 iterations in (2). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard e r-
rors are given in parentheses and are bootstrapped with 500 iterations in (2). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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